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ABSTRACT
It Is often difficult to describe the dynamics of system be
havior, for example, collective bargaining type behavior.

One reason for

the difficulty in modelling such situations has been the lack of modelling
techniques that can handle abrupt changes in the behavior of the system*
However, Rene Them's catastrophe theory has provided some new insights
Into phenomena Involving sudden transitions*
The cusp catastrophe model presented in this study takes into
account the possibility of multi-valuedness of the response variable*
The model provides a rational explanation of phenomena having the follow
ing characteristicst

Bimodality, sudden transitions, hysteresis, Inac

cessibility, and divergence*

This paper attempts to empirically verify

the usefulness of the cusp model in describing the dynamics of system
behavior in simulated bargaining situations*
The cusp model is illustrated by a data set generated by
simulating a collective bargaining prooess*

The simulation consisted of

3$ teams (of four subjects each).participating in a collective bargaining
game*

The data set consisting of 2£8 samples of hour-long rounds of

formal negotiations provided data on the demand intensities of the bar
gaining subjects, idie expected and observed system behavior*

Statistical

analysis indicated that the cusp model is a good fit for observed system
behavior in simulated bargaining situations*
While the results indicated possible usefulness of the cusp
model, a more definitive study using larger sample sizes and alternative
vii

designs might establish the descriptive effectiveness of the model more
conclusively.

Hopefully, this preliminary study is the first step in

the attempt at empirical verifications of the value of some of the catas
trophe models in social sciences and business research.

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
Increased understanding of the nature of human conflict and
Its resolution has been one of the primary objectives of soolal scien
tists*

The work of von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Qaaes

and Economic Behavior (19U7) provided a mew direction In this area by
reinforcing the economic theory of conflicts with, mathematics and
1
general methodology*
The theory of games deals with decisions; it Is a normative
theory indicating how rational players can be expected to make decisions.
There are canstant-sum games, cooperative and non-cooperative non2
constant-sum games*
However, the theory is not a descriptive theory
In that it does not describe how people actually make decisions.^ In
actual situations, often interests of people are partly coincident and
partly opposed, indicating a tendency to cooperate to further common
interests and a tendency to compete to enhance their own Individual
Interests*

Thus, the basic problem stems from the fact that while the

parties at conflict are independent in their roles as decision makers,
<1
J* von Neumann and O* Morgenstern, The Theory of Panes and
Economic Behavior (Princeton! Princeton University press, 19h7)*
2
J.C* Harsaayi, "Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solu
tions in Cooperative and Non-cooperative Qames," Management Science,

9> (1962), pp. 11*1-153.
*A. Rapoport, M.J. Quyer and D.Q. Oordon, The 2 x 2 Qeaa.
IAnn Arbor t The University of Michigan Press, 1976), p* 3*

their welfare la mutually dependent.^

Businessmen, administrators, and

military strategists are frequently involved in such decision making
behavior,

Situations of this nature Include union-management collective

bargaining, peace negotiations in International relations, etc*, and may
be termed aa collective bargaining type situations*
Since real life situations are rather complex, it is often
desirable to design situations where bargaining behavior can be observed
in order to draw some Inferences on conflicts in general*

Such gaming

experiments nay be termed as simulated bargaining situations*

However,

since simulations involving human behavior are not easily reproducible,
the inferences one might draw from them may be of limited relevance in
the construction of theories of conflict resolution*'*

On the other

hand, these simulations must be undertaken as a first step in system
atically desorlbing certain aspects of the dynamics of conflict*
This study Is concerned with simulated bargaining situations
of the nature of union-management collective bargaining*

Uhion-

aaaagewent collective bargaining is perhaps one of the more typical of
collective bargaining type situations*

In this context, collective

bargaining is the Institutional process for solving problems involving
employer-employee relationship*

A significant part of this process

is the negotiation between the company and union representatives in an
effort to reach agreement on the terms aad conditions of employment*

^L.E, FOuraker and S* Siegel, Bargaining Behavior. (New Yorks
MoQraw-Hill Bock Coopany, Inc., 1965), pp* 9u-9o*
'’A* Rapoport, et al., p. 11*

The bargaining behavior of such a system nay be assumed to range from
strike to lookout, including the nore eoanon position of mutual agree*
£.
ment, Stagner and Rosen postulate that both bargaining parties hare
certain expectations and tolerance limits which define a bargaining sons
(see figure 1). Is the parties bargain, they explore these limits In an
effort to find an area in which a compromise is possible.
limits are exceeded, a strike or a lockout may result.

If these

This model appears

to be a good description of the collective bargaining process in general,
but is essentially a static nodel.
Until recently, relatively fewer attempts appear to have been
made in understanding the dynamics of formal negotiations.

According to

Hicks and Gullet^ little analysis of interorganlzatlonal behavior has
been done, aad they believe that progress is sorely needed in this area,
Che reason for the difficulty in modeling such situations has been the
lack of techniques that can handle abrupt changes in the behavior of the
system such as strikes and lockouts.

However, a relatively new area of

mathematics research called catastrophe theory has opened up some inter
esting possibilities.
effect processes.

This theory has been used to model cause and
D
The originator of this theory, Thom , has provided a

breakthrough in the modeling of complex dynamic behavior, in which con-

^R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of lfaion-Hanagement Rela
tions. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Htbllstusg Company, 19c£), pp. &*6.
7

H.O, Rioks and C.R. Gullet, The Management of Organisations
(3d e d . ( H e w lark: MoQraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1976), p. 168,
g
R. Them, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, (New York:
W.A. Benjamin, Lao.,

FIGURE I
SIAONER-ROSEN MODEL FOR BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
(Adapted from Stagner and Rosen, 1965)
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tinuous changes can cause discontinuous effects*

Hie pioneering book,

Structural Stability end Morphogenesis <1975)# provides the conceptual
framework for catastrophe theory.

This theory has been applied during

the past five years in many disciplines, including physios, biology, social
sciences, economics, and psychology.

Catastrophe theory has provided new

insights Into phenomena involving sudden transitions.

Based on differen

tial topology, the nathematioal proofs of the theorems are rather dif
ficult to comprehend; however, the theory easily lends itself to many in
terpretations and applications.
Based on the Stagner-Bosen description of collective bargain9
ing behavior, Oliva and Capdevielle have conceptualised an application
of one of the catastrophe models, the cusp model10 to collective bar
gaining situations to help explain the dynamics of the system behavior*
In a broad sense, their model attempts to examine the system behavior in
terms of two variables: management demand intensity and union demand
Intensity,

The purpose of this study is to examine the descriptive ef

fectiveness of the cusp model by evaluating its validity in simulated
bargaining situations.

Of the several applications of catastrophe theory,

relatively fewer models appear to have been tested even in laboratory
experiments.

According to Sutherland11, empirical validation of models

9

T.A. Oliva and C,H, Capdevielle, "Collective Bargaining as a
Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of Academy of Management (1977a),
10A detailed description of the cusp model is presented in
Chapter U ,
Sutherland, Systems: Analysis. Administration, and
Architecture. (New York: Von Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1975),

is a critical feature of system approach*

Therefore, to be consistent

with the system approach, validation exeroises oast be undertaken to
the descriptive effectiveness of the models*

However, such exes*

elsea need only be aimed at application situations, since validity of an
application would automatically reflect on the validity of the concep
tual model*

In this sense laboratory testing of collective bargaining

behavior appears to be a promising way to explore the validity of the
cusp model.

To accomplish this purpose several working hypotheses were

proposed.^-2
This study has focused on two variables, management demand
intensity and union demand intensity; the experimental procedure adopted
in this study eliminates other variables which may well be important in
bargaining.

The data collection has focused on the relative perception

of the variables (not their absolute amounts)*^

The scope of this re

search is thus confined to simulated bargaining situations involving
these two variables*
PLAN OF DEVELOPMENT
In Chapter H a review of background information relevant to
this study is presented*

After discussing some basic concepts of bar

gaining behavior, the chapter evaluates the merits of the descriptive aid
normative approaches in this area, with particular reference to collec

12

The working hypotheses are presented in Chapter III*
13
A. Soodel, J.S* Minas,P. Ratoosh and M. LLpeta, "Sane Des
criptive Aspeots of Two-Person Non-Zero Sun Games," Journal of Conflict
flesolutlon* 3, (19i>9), pp* Uli-119* According to the authors, relative
stanciing seems more important than absolute benefits in conflicts*

tive bargaining situations • Next, catastrophe models are presented in
general without their mathematical derivations, followed by a more de
tailed description of the cusp model.

The application of the cusp model

to collective bargaining situations is explained in terms of isomorphic
relationship between the two.

Illustrations are provided to help explain

the bargaining behavior of the system in terms of management and union
demand intensities.
Chapter III discusses the research methodology and the proce
dures for collection of data.

The chapter begins by some of the key

definitions, and explains the subjects,procedures and instruments for
data collection.

The instruments used for data collection are a psycho

logical insight test questionnaire aad a collective bargaining game.

The

chapter also contains statements of working and formal hypotheses, and
procedures for the analysis of data.

The chi-square test for goodness

of fit was adopted for testing the hypotheses.

The collective bargaining

game consists of negotiation of a hypothetical agreement between prese
lected pairs of subjects.

The selection of subjects is based on their

responses to the psychological insight test questionnaire.

The demand

intensities of the participants are measured in successive rounds of ne
gotiations and the actual behavior of the system is recorded.

The ex

pected behavior of the system is estimated from the cusp model, and tested
for statistical significance.

The chapter finally discusses the experi

mental procedure in general.
The results of the research and the findings are presented in
Chapter 17. Chapter 7 contains a discussion of results and the conclu
sions of this inquiry.

Finally sane suggestions for further research

are proposed.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this ohapber is to present a review of the
literature relevant to this study*

The first part is an introduction of

various ooncepts relating to bargaining behavior in general and collec
tive bargaining behavior in particular, and a broad discussion of aana
of the existing models*

The second part takes a look at a new genera

tion of models called catastrophe models*

Some of the basic ooncepts

underlying catastrophe theory are introduced and the Implications of
these models are briefly outlined*

The cusp catastrophe model is

examined in detail since it is the specific structure chosen for this
research.

The third part examines a model of collective bargaining be

havior by establishing an isomorphism between collective bargaining phe
nomenon and the cusp model*
CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In a broad sense, conflict presupposes clashes of values and
Interests between groups of individuals*1 According to Walton and
2
McKersle, the intergroup conflicts may arise when there is an Interaction

■Hf*J. Soott aad T.R, Mitchell. Organisation Theory: A Struc
tural and Behavioral Analysis (Homewood, Illinois: HLohard d* Irwin, Ibo,,
1972), p. 189* For a typology of conflicts and causes, see T.V. Bonama,
"Conflict,Cooperation and Trust in Three Power Systems," Behavioral
Solenoe* 21 (Nov. 1976),pp. U99-£Ll.
2
R.E* Nhlton and R.B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor
Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 3*

10
of two or more complex social units whloh are attempting to define or re
define the terns of their Interdependence*

In an abstract sense, conflict

arises when two or more entitles try to occupy the sane state-space, but
•7
only one can do so.
Conflict resolution involves a search for an outcome which r^
presents for sane participants an improvement from, and to no partici
pants a worsening of, their present situation.^ However, in sons
instances, the resolution nay result in gains for some participants at
the expense of others.

In general, there is a diversity of opinion abort

the origins, functions, and resolution of conflict among behavioral
scientists*

conflicts:

March and Simon indicate four common outcomes of intergroup
£
1)
2)
3)
1|)

Problem-solving behavior,
persuation,
bargaining, and
political behavior*

In problem solving,the conflicting units seek the most effec
tive means for reaching agreed upon goals*

In persuation, each unit

D,R, Hampton, C.E* Summer and R.A. Webber, Organisational
Behavior and the Practice of Management (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
fcbresman and Company, 1973 ), p* £>71.
kj.M. Alexander and T.L. Saaty, "The Forward and Backward
Process of Conflict Analysis," Behavioral Science. 22 (Mar, 1977), p* 87*
Kerch aad H* Simon, Organisations (Dew York: John Wiley
aad Sons, 1928), pp* 121-129* For a somewhat similar analysis of qopfliot
resolution see S. LaTour, P*Houlden, L, Welker and J« Thibaut, "Sobs
Determinants of Preference Modes of Conflict Resolution, ” Journal of Con
flict Resolution. 20 (June 1976), pp* 319-326* The authors discuss con
flict resolubioa procedures arranged along a continuum of decreasing
third-party intervention*

11
trlea to persuade the other unit to accept lte goals aa legitimate.

Once

goals are agreed upon, it la relatively easy to find the moat effective
means for reaching them.

In bargaining, goal conflict is explicit and

recognised, but there is some agreement on the procedures that may le
gitimately be eqpleysd for resolving the conflict.

In politics, there is

total disagreement not only on goals but on the means by which the con
flict may be resolved,** The assumption in the first three outcomes is
that although there is conflict, agreement is possible; and that the
factors that significantly affect these conflicts are interdependence,
goal and perceptual differences.

In a majority of intergroup conflicts,

the process of bargaining is believed to have broad appeal,
BARGAINING
7

Bargaining implies bilateral negotiation.

It is defined as

a process wheret
1) there are two or more parties with diverging interests,
2) the parties can communicate,
3) mutual compromise is possible,
Uj provisional offers can be made, and
*>) the provisional offers do not fix the tangible outoomes
until aa offer is accepted by all sides. ®
Thus bargaining is said to occur when parties at conflict confer and
exchange ideas about a possible settlement until either a compromise is
reached or the bargaining is terminated.^

^Loc. cit,
7
3. LaTour, et al., op,cit., p, 320.
o
J*M. Ghertkoff and J,K. Baser, "A Review of Experiments in
Explicit Bargaining." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 12
<£fept. 1976), p. W K ----------- --------------- ----^Ibid.

12
The social patterns of stress, conflict, and bargaining are
inevitable in a dianglmg miTli niawnit,10 Ohertkoff and Baser11 suggest
that bargaining Is a pervasive and important phenomenon; it occurs bet
ween individuals, greqps, organisations aad countries.

Examples include

uaLom-managemsnt disputes, international disputes, territorial disputes,
price disputes, and even domestic disputes. Bargaining behavior of the
system is the end result of decision making behavior12 of the partici
pants.

Compromise aad lapaase In formal negotiations are examples of

the bargaining behavior of the system.11
The current approaches to the study of phenomena involving
bargaining behavior fall into two distinct classes: descriptive and
normative.

The descriptive approach attempts to describe how real people

make decisions in situations involving conflicts of interestsj while the
normative approach attempts to discover how certain idealised actors,
called rational players, can be expected to males decisions in such situa
tions.1^

10C. Barnard, The functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Tfeiversitjr Press, 1950}, p. 36.
11
J.H, Ohertkoff aad J.K, Baser, op, cit*, p. Ii6t»,
12
Some authors refer to this as choice behavior: S, Siegel,
A,E, Siegel and J.M. Andrews, Choice. Strategy and Utility (Hew Tork:
HoOrav-HLU Book Coaqpaqy, 196U).
13
L.C. Hegginson, Personnel and Kama Resources Administration
(Homewood, Illinois* Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 19?Y), pp. 5^3-^5.
^A, Bapoport, M,J* Ouyer and D,Q, Oorden, The 2 x 2 Qame
(Aim Arbor: The IMversity of Michigan Press, 1976), p. 33,

13
DESCRIPTIVE MODELS
Traditionally, bargaining behavior was assumed to be a funotion of relative bargaining power of the parties at conflict.

Pigou

described bargaining in terns of upper and lower Units of the demands
of the participants leading to two types of bargaining behavior: a com
promise in a range of practical bargaining, and an impasse with no area
for pr&ctioal bargaining.
Tertnme^ has developed a modified Lewlnian model for twoperson interaction behavior:

where

B.. « Interaction behavior of the system comprising lndividuals i and J,
Pj P. . The system qualities defined as the configuration of
3 personalities within the system, as may be Indicated,
for example by a multiplicative sum of relevant per
sonality dimensions, and
S. « Contributions of the situation within which the actors
are behaving.

Terhune refers to interaction behavior of the system in terms of coopera17

tion, exploitation, and conflict.
1*5

A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare Uth ed. (London: Mac
millan & Co., Ltd., 1933)* pp. i&0-ii61. For a comparative discussion of
Pigou's model see L.C. Megginson, op. cit., pp. J>2‘J-J>26. A more detailed
discussion of bargaining theories from the behavioral point of view is
provided in H.E. Walton and R.B. McKersie, op. cit. See also by the same
authors, "The Theory of Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
(April 1966), pp. blb-li2lu
^K.W, Terhune, "Waah-in, Wash-out and Systemic Effects in Ex
tended Prisoner*s Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 18 (Dec 191k),
pp. 680—683.
17
Ih this model, interaction behavior of the system has the same
implication as bargaining behavior of the system. Although the model was
developed to explain interaction behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma situations,
it applies in general to the process of bargaining.

lit
In a general sense, the descriptive models attempt to relate
the bargaining behavior of the system with the behavioral/situational
variables*

However, contributors In this area appear to differ as to

the relative inqportanee of some of the specific determinants of bargain
ing behavior*
NORMATIVE MODELS
The origin of normative models may be traced to the work of
von Neumann and Morgenstem, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.^
Game theory can be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in
20
eonfliot situations* Models of such situations Involve:
1)
2)
3)

a set of decision makers, called players,
a set of strategies available to each player,
a set of outcomes, each of which is a result ofparticular
choices of strategies made by the players on a given
play of the game, and
1*) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the
possible outcones*
There are two olasses of models in game theory:

the constant-

sum (special case: zero-sum) models and the nonconstant-sum models*

In

constant-sum games, the interests of players are diametrically opposed,
and in nonconstant-sum games, these Interests may partially coincide*
Models are also sometimes classified with reference to the number of

a recent review of a number of alternative approaches
see M* Patohen, "Models of Cooperation and Conflict: A Critical Review,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1U (Sept 1970), pp. 389-1*07: J.M. Chertkoff and «y*K. Baser, pp* cit*
19

J. von Neumann and 0* Morgenstem, The Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University press, 191*7)•
20
A. Rapoport (ed*), Game Theory aa a Theory of Conflict Resolu
tion (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971*), pp* 1-3*
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players, and according to the degree of freedom In choice of strategies;
these strategies could be mixed (probabilistically chosen) or pure*
The constant-sum models are based on the assertion that there
exists, available to each player, at least one optimal strategy, which
may be pure or mixed*

21

A player choosing such an optimal strategy can

guarantee himself a certain minimal payoff; this means that each player
can keep the other's payoff down to the letter's guaranteed minimum*
The resulting outcome of the game is called equilibrium; it is Paretooptimal if there is no other outcome in which both players get a larger
payoff*

It is then possible to prescribe an optimal strategy to each

player; if both players follow this prescription, each will do as well
as he possibly can in that game (against a rational player)*

Von Neumann

and Morgenstem also show that if there are several equilibria, deter
mined by paired choice of optimal strategies, then they will all be
22
equivalent and interchangeable.
Implication of these models is that
if one player keeps to his optimal strategy, the other can not Improve
his payoff by shifting away from his own optimal strategy, he may actual
ly impair his payoff in the process.
Solutions of nonoonstant-sum games involving more than two
players are less satisfactory in a normative sense*

These games are

further classified as non-cooperative and cooperative games depending on
whether the choices of strategies must be made independently or coor
dinated,

These are games in which the interests of the players partially

21
J* von Neumann and 0* Morgenstern, loc, cit.
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coincide in that both M y prefer one outcome to another. Although every
non-cooperative game with a finite nunber of playere and etrategiee has
at leaat one equilibrium,

there could be several equilibria that are

not necessarily equivalent or Interchangeable.
bria are frequently, Pareto-deficient.

Further, these equili2k
Harsanyl ^ tries to overctane some

of these difficulties by allowing communication and bargaining In noncooperative games.

The possibility of oanmunication and bargaining is

said to greatly facilitate the establishment of a unique solution.

How

ever, Harsanyl assumes that the players are not able to make enforceable
agreements and excludes nonequilibrium strategy pairs from consideration
as solutions.
The theory of cooperative games Introduces communication,
bargaining and enforceable agreements into game-theoretic concepts as
possible means of arriving at Pareto-optimal solutions.

In a cooperative

game, although the Interests of the players can be and generally are in
(partial) conflict, it still makes sense for them to cooperate in order
to ensure Pareto-optimality of the outcome.

If the game has more than

one such outcome, it Is among them that the preferences of the players
26
are in conflict.
Such a game is also a nonconstant-sum game since there
are outcomes that are preferred by both players to other outcomes.
21
J.F. Nash, "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games," Proceed
ings of the National Academy of Sciences (PSA). 36 (19£o), pp. h$-li9.

Harsanyl, "Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solu
tions In Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games," Management Science. 9
(1962), pp. 1U1-1S3.
2*Ibid.
26
A. Rapoport (1976), op. cit., p. £0.
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Rapoport's example of simple bargaining Involves a seller and a buyerj
the seller is milling to sell an object at any price above a certain
rtrHnim price.

If the maximum price the buyer la willing to pay is less

than the n&ninnnn price the seller is willing to accept, obviously no
agreement is possible] however, if the buyer's maximum exceeds the
seller'8 minimum, there exists a negotiation set (which may also be con
sidered as a single-valued curve of possible rational solutionsJ. This
situation is called elementary bargaining problem (Figure II), and its
solution is assumed to be contingent upon symmetry, Pareto Optimality,
independence from Irrelevant alternatives, and invariance under positive
linear transformations.*^ Different methods of solving this problem are
OQ
available.
These solutions have preserved lesser normative flavor in
terms of prescribing rational decision-making behavior, as compared with
the oanstant-ffum games. A special case of nonconstant-sum game called
"Prisoner's Dilemma" has posed a fundamental question for proponents of
normative models.

The question "What is rational choice?" in this situa-

A, Rapoport, "Conflict Resolution in light of Dame Theory,"
in P. Swingle (ed.), The Structure of Conflict (New York: Academic Press,
1970), pp. 1-1*2. Variations of the elementary bargaining problem are
disoussed by several authors. They attempt to explore the effeots of
certain factors relating to initial conditions,magnitude and frequency
of concessions, and information about payoffs upon bargaining behavior.
For more details, see Q.A. Yuld, "Effects of Opponent's Initial Offer,"
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 30, (1971*), pp. 325-335}
J.ri. Ghertkoff and J.K. Esser, op. cit.| D. Bruckman and T.V. Bonoma,
"Determinants of Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Situation
IX: Opponent's Concession Rate and Similarity," Behavioral Science. 21,
(July 1976), pp. 252-262} D.S. Felsenthal, "Bargaining Behavior when
Profits are Unequal and Losses are Equal," Behavioral Science. 22, (Sept
1977), pp. 33U-3UO.
^J.F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrics. 18, (1950),
pp. 155-162. For recent work on Nash's model, see R.V. Nydegger,
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FIGURE II
THE UTILITY PAYOFF SPACE OF THE ELEMENTARY BARGAINING PROBLEM
(Adapted from A. Rapoport, "Conflict Resolution In the Light
of Game Theory," in P. Swingle (ed.), The structure of Con
flict, New York, Academic Press, 1970, pp. lo-ll)

(0,0)
Legend: Curve : the negotiation set
Origin: the statue quo point
(x,y) : a possible outcome

x : Utility gain of Player 1
y : Utility gain of Player 2

Solution: Of all possible rectangles with one comer at the Origin
and another on the negotiation set, the rectangle that has
Idle largest area defines the solution to the bargaining
problem.
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tion centers around two concepts of rationality, namely individual ra20
tionality and collective rationality, 7
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A special type of bargaining commonly known as collective
bargaining occurs in union-management disputes, international disputes,
territorial disputes, etc.

Situations of this nature will be referred

to as collective bargaining type situations.

According to Davis,

it is essentially a compromise and balancing of opposing pressures; and
the objective of collective bargaining is to work toward a new equili
brium of sooial forces and to make it easier to maintain this equili
brium,
Hagginson^ defines collective bargaining as a sooial, as
wall as a legal and economic process.

In the context of Uhion-management

conflict, collective bargaining is the Institutional process for solving
problems involving terms and conditions of employment via formal nego
tiations,

Such negotiation normally culminates in the signing of a

written instrument, termed labor agreement or union contract, which sets

"Independent Utility Scaling and the Nash Bargaining Model," Behavioral
Science, 22, (July 1977), pp, 283-289; M, Stwaan and J,B. Crus, Jr.,
uNash Equilibrium Strategies for the Problem of Armament Control,"
Management Science. 22, (sept 197$), PP* 96-105,
29

A, Rapoport (197U), op, clt«, pp, 17-5U, Between 1952 and
present, several hundreds of experimental studies have been reported on
Prisoner's Dilemma, This game has brought to focus some of the limita
tions of normative approaches to choice behavior,
30

K, Davis, Human Behavior at Work (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1972), p, 27a.
» W I . Megginson, Personnel: A behavioral Approach to Adminis
tration (Homewood, Illinois: Rickard D, Irwin, Inc., 1972), p, 173,

20
forth the terns and conditions of employment for a fixed period of tine.
However, disruptive labor-management relationships may also develop
during the negotiations, in the form of threatened or actual strikes and
lookouts.
Kochan-Wheeler description of the collective bargaining pro
cess postulates that the relationships between environmental character
istics union and management organizational characteristics, and the
bargaining process determine the bargaining outcomes.
Stagner and Rosen

32

have proposed a more specific description

of collective bargaining behavior in terms of motivation, perception,
organization and leadership as the basic variables which manifest in the
form of desires and expectations (see Figure 1 in Chapter I):
32
For more details see T.A. Kochan and H.N. Wheeler, "Municipal
Collective Bargaining: A Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes,11
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 29 (Oct. 1975). pp. 1:6-66. A
similar description may be found in P.F. Gerhart, "Determinants of Bar
gaining Outcomes in Local Government Labor Negotiations," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 29 (Apr 1976), pp. 331-351.
^R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union-Management Rela
tions (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, Inc., 19^5), pp. 90-96. Similar
description of bargaining behavior as a function of behavioral variables
may be found in S.H. Slichter, J.J. Healy and E.R. Iivemash, The 3apact
of Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1960;$ R.E. Walton and R.B, MoKersie, A Behavioral Theory
of Labor Negotiation, op. cit.; M.S. Vfortman and C.W. Randle, Col3ective
Bargaining Principles and Practice (Boston: Houghton Mlffin Co., 1966J)
ff.M. Levinson. Determining Forces"in Collective Bargaining (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966); L.C. Megginson and C.R.' Gullet, "A Pre
dictive Model of Union-Manageraent Conflict," Personnel Journal (June
1970)j J.B. Miner and M.G. Miner, Personnel and Industrial Relations:
A Managerial Approach (New York: MacMillan & do., ktd., 1973)'; ^.H.'
Cassel and J.J. Baron, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector (Colum
bus: Grid Ins., 1975 )j S.W. deilerman. Managersand Subordinates (Hinadale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976); and L.C, Megginson (19t7), op.
cit.) T.A. Kochan and H.N. Wheeler, op, cit.) and P.F. Gerhart, op. cit.
In a general sense, the Stagner-Rosen description seems to have broad
appeal.
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Both parties bring eertaln expectations to the negotia
tions* It is general practice for each group to write
its own expectations into proposals for the new con
tract*.«,
Similarly, each side is likely to have, at
the beginning of negotiations, an idea of the limit
beyond which it will make no concessions, this limit
results in a bargaining tone for each side, with the
preferred solution on one end and the tolerance limit
on the other***.* As the parties bargain, they ex
plore these limits and, hopefully, find an area in
which a compromise is possible. For both sides, there
is a bargaining aone between the employer's tolerance
limit and the union tolerance limit*.••« Bach side
can always find some instances to support the "wished
for" solution; and each side will tend to ignore the
evidence presented by the opposition. Nevertheless,
communication does take place; each takes cognisance
of the data, and the acceptability shifts. Manage
ment moves up a little, and the union moves down a
little, until an acceptable point for both Is reached.
The Stagner-Rosen model also implicitly recognises the bargain
ing behavior of the system when the tolerance limits of the participants
is reached*

The implication is that when the union tolerance limit is

reached, rather than yielding further, the union may declare a strike;
and a lockout may result if the management perceives that its tolerance
35
limit has been reached*
DISCUSSION OF CURRENT APPROACHES
ttiere seem to be same new trends in building descriptive and
predictive models of bargaining behavior.

However, the proponents of

descriptive models intuitively recognise that it is often difficult to

3l*Ibid.
35
For a somewhat similar description of bargaining behavior see
E.R. Brown, "The Effects of Need to Maintain Face on Interpersonal Bar
gaining," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, h (Mar. 1968), pp.
107-122*
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describe the dynamics of bargaining behavior (even in a qualitative sense)
especially in collective bargaining situations.

For instance, company

executives often confess that they had no idea the union would strike
over an apparently minor demand,and union leaders sometimes err in esti
mating management's intensity of feeling:
Both sides are human} managers have certain expectations
about "management rights,” which may trigger such strong
emotions that rational bargaining is impossible. Union
ists, likewise, have emotions, which sometimes prevent
them from seeing issues realistically, so that they
strike even though it cannot possibly lead to any net
economic gain.3°
Such is the complexity of collective bargaining type situations.

Thus,

one must reluctantly conclude that the existing descriptive models are
essentially static and do not apperar to Capture the dynamic properties

of the system} they also seem to lack mathematical elegance and very few
attempts appear to have been made to quantify the behavioral variables
involved in the models.

37

A major problem with the normative models is that these models
attempt to predict how the participants ought to behave under assumptions
about variables such as their rationality, information, preferences, and
«
risk-taking propensities, instead of incorporating propositions that ex
plain or describe how the participants act or the actual outcomes of the
36
37

R. Stagner and H. Rosen, op. cit.

For specific criticisms and a more detailed discussion of
some of the problems involved, see J.M. Chertkoff and J.K. Esser, op.
cit., pp. U6u-U68. The authors suggest that the existing models suffer
from one or more of the following problems: (1) There are measurement
problems in quantifying the mediating factors, (2) the relations between
possible variables and the mediating factors are no spelled out clearly,
(3) the theories are stated so broadly and/or with so little precision
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process*

That is, the normative models are concerned with the structure

of games and disregard suoh important factors as individual personali
ties of the players, their bargaining abilities, their relations to each
other; the players are simply assumed to be "rational,Additionally,
the much publicized Prisoner's Dilemma has exposed the ambivalence of
optimal strategy in general.

The result is that there has been a heavy

emphasis on experimental games involving predispositional variables such
as personality, power, threats, etc.

However, contributors differ as to

the relative importance of structural vs. behavioral variables as deter
minants of bargaining behavior.
In sunnary, both descriptive and normative models have weak
nesses; the descriptive models are static, and there are controversies
about the extent of relevance of game-theoretic conclusions to collective
bargaining type situations. Attempts to integrate game-theoretic formu
lations with experimental procedures in behavioral theory appear to be
promising, but do not seem to adequately explain sudden transitions in
bargaining behavior in general and collective bargaining behavior in
particular. 39 Therefore, the descriptive effectiveness of these models

that very few if any findings could ever lead to rejection or modification
of the theories. These criticisms apply to the normative models as well
in varying degrees.

,o

A. Raqpoport and J. Peraer, "Nash's Solution of Cooperative
Game," in A, Bapoport (ed.), op. cit., p. llU.
^Por recent work in this area see D. Druckman and T.7. Bonoma,
op* cit. The authors observe that bargainers sometimes retaliate to the
opponent's pressure by suddenly decreasing concessions, even rejecting
the process completely. However, the explanation provided by the authors
for suoh behavior appears to be rather limited in scope.
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appears to be somewhat limited*

Oliva and Capdevlelle have suggested

that some of these problems might be overcome by mapping the important
characteristics of the Stagner-Rosen model onto the cusp catastrophe
model.^

A review of catastrophe theory and an explanation of the cusp

catastrophe model are provided in the following sections,
CATASTROPHE THEORY
Catastrophe theory, a relatively new area of mathematics re
search, has provided a breakthrough In the modeling of complex dynamic
behavior.

The developer of the theory, Thom, has provided the conceptual

framework for catastrophe theory in his book, Structural stability and
I
Morphogenesis,
According to Zeeman:
*.•* The method has potential for describing the evolu
tion of forms in all aspects of nature, and hence it
embodies a theory of great generality; it can be applied
with particular effectiveness in those situations where
gradually changing forces or motivations lead to abrupt
changes in behavior. For this reason the method has
been named catastrophe theory.
Phenomena involving sudden variations traditionally had been
assumed to be outside the reach of mathematical treatment, because they
lacked what was considered to be an essential precondition, the conti
nuity of dependence relations between the variable s.^

The main thrust

k°T.A. Oliva and C.M, Capdevlelle, “Collective Bargaining as a
Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of Academy of Management. (1977a),
^R, Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis (Reading,
Massachusetts: W.A. Benjamin, inc., 1975).
^2E.C, Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory," scientific American
(April 1976), p. 69.
^C.A. Xsnard and E.C. Zeeman, "Some Models from Catastrophe
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FIGURE III
Behavior of a Single-valued Function
(Adapted from Thom, 1977;

£(x)

X

I
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FIGURE 17
Behavior of a Moltl-valued Function
(Adapted from Thom, 1977)

x
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of catastrophe theory is the explanation of how gradually changing forces
can cause discontinuous (catastrophic) behavior. According to Thom,
"these phenomena are highly unstable, difficult to repeat, and hard to
fit into a mathematical theory, because the characteristics of all form,
all morphogenesis, is to display itself through discontinuities of the
environment."^ These sudden transformations and unpredictable diver
gences render the traditional mathematical models inadequate, since these
models depend on the use of continuous (single-valued; functions.

Thom^

suggests that the use of single-valued functions may be inappropriate for
modeling sudden transitions and unexpected divergences, and thus the tra
ditional models often fail to capture the true causal relationships.

In

support of this "finite hypothesis," Thom has provided several illustra
tions.
Figure III shows a system defined by two single-valued para
meters (a and b).
singularities.

Movement along the curve is possible only between the

In the process of gradually changing the oontrol variable,

exceeding singularity b, or not reaching singularity a, would cause the
system to break down.

However, if the system is defined by parameters

that can take on more than one value (represented by a behavior surface
with a fold in the middle), gradual changes in the control variable would
cause sudden changes at the singular points (see Figure 17).

Theory in the Social Sciences," in C. Collins (ed.) The Use of Models in
the Sooial Sciences (Boulder, Colorado: Vfestview Press,1976;, p. U5.
^R. Them, op. cit., p. 9.
^R. Thorn, "Catastrophe Theory and its Applications," Pasqualle
Porcelll Memorial Lecture (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University, June 16, 1977).
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Thom calls these sudden changes as catastrophes, and has shown
that such changes occur as a result of local minimisation of potential
energy at the singularities*^ The behavior of the system is said to be
a function of possible families of potentials, and can be represented by
structurally stable topological surfaces.^7 Topology is a branch of
mathematics concerned with the properties of surfaces in many dimensions.
Thom calls the shape of the structurally stable (equilibrium) surfaces
as morphologies.The proceeding arguments can be expressed mathematili9

cally as follows:

Notation: Consider a process p in which C (cause) causes B (effect)*
Topologically C and B are smooth surfaces (also known as manifolds) and
the process is usually expressed as p : C x B

C, that is, p takes

a point C and processes it to generate a value on B, and this relation
ship may be studied by* looking at C.

This notation preserves the direc

tion of causality in contrast with algebraic notation involving equa
tions*

The notation also implies that the process is smooth and real

valued, that is, the chain of causality is smooth and real*

Points c

on the surface C can be partitioned into "regular" points and "catastro\
phe" points* Regular points exhibit homeomorphism, that is, there exists
a one-to-one map that is smooth and has a smooth inverse between B and Cj

k6Ibid.
**7Ibid.
**8Ibid.
The mathematical notation is adopted from R. Thom (197!?), op,
cit., and B.C. Zeeman, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," Tokyo Inter
national Conference on Manifolds (1973)*
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points not possessing this characteristic are called catastrophe points*
Thom suggests that use of single-valued functions would be inappropriate
to explain the catastrophe points.

His method overcomes this difficul

ty by the use of multi-valued functions*
Suppose f : Rk x H*1

R be a smooth function representing

a dynamic system where R^ (the control surface) represents the cause
(with k ^

?),

R31 (the behavior surface) represents the effect, and

f represents a potential or an energy function.
to attempt to locally minimize

Then the system is said

f. In a sense, the system adopts a mini

max strategy as defined in game theory.'’® Thombelieves that all conflicts evolve so as to minimize the damage that results.
For any given control point c € R^, the local potential
function f s R*1-^ R given by f (x) - f (c,x) can be minimized locally
o
c
by differentiating

f with respect to x. Thus for any differential
c
equation x - - grad f ■ 0 defines lo c a l minima, where
X*
x - (X?, .... xn ) £ tf1, and grad^ f - grad £q » (|£ .... ^ ) .
Then the stable equilibria are given by the minima of f . Since there
v

is obviously more than one singularity x
valued function

C

of f , x
O

C

will be a multi-

Rn, Now consider the maxima of fv . Suppose

when grad^ f * 0, where generically H^, is a k-manifold
given by n equations, and X£ «* -►
Thom*s Theorem: If f
open-dense set), then (l)

is the catastrophe map of f.
is generic (i.e., belongs to an

is a k-manifoldj (2) Any singularity of

^°J. von Neumann and 0# Morgenstem, op. cit.; the authors
provide a detailed discussion of minimax theorem.
^R. Thom (197?), op. cit., p. UU3.
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is equivalent^2 to one of a finite number of elementary catastrophes
(for K^T U, the number of elementary catastrophes ■ 7){ and (3) X^ is
stable

under small perturbations of f.
di.
discussed here*)

(Proof of the theorem is not

Catastrophe theory holds that discontinuities and divergences
are mathematically natural and can be precisely handled.

Thom argues

that the behavior of a system can be represented by morphologies, and
postulates that catastrophe theory is involved with morphogenesis (the
genesis of form) in the Universe.^
56
According to Zeeman,
catastrophes occur when the equilibrium
breaks down.

Catastrophe theory attempts to describe the shapes of all

possible morphologies.

In particular, if the system is governed through

potentials by at most a four-dimensional control, structurally stable
catastrophes can occur in only seven ways as shown.

These seven elemen

tary catastrophes describe all possible discontinuities in phenomena
controlled by no more than four factors, and are given by simple poly-

52
Two graphs X, and X2 are equivalent in a qualitative sense
if there is a diffeomorpnisra (a one-to-one map of the plane onto Itself
that is smooth and has smooth inverse) of the plane that maps vertical
lines to vertical lines and maps
to X^. For more details see loo. cit.
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Stable means that Xf is equivalent to X for all g in a
neighborhood of f.
g
%V>r a comparatively less rigorous proof see T. Poston and I.
Stewart, "Thorn's Classification Theorem: Intuitive Approach," in T.
Poston and I. Stewart, Taylor Expansions and Catastrophies (Belmont,
California: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1976), pp. 22-76.
55

^ R . Thom (197*0, op. cit., p. 320.
^^E.C. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory," Scientific American
(April 1976), p. 78.
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nominals (see Table I).^7
In the proceeding table, each of the seven catastrophes is
associated with a potential function in which the control parameters are
represented as coefficients (a, b, c, d; and the behavior of the system
is determined by the variables (x, y).

Hie behavior surface in each

model is the graph of all the points where the first derivatives are
equal to sero.
Catastrophe theory has been applied in several fields includ
ing physics, biology, and social sciences*

Some of the phenomena that

have been explained using catastrophe models are: the catastrophe ma
chine, aggression, committee behavior, national defense, economic growth,
nerve impulse, phase transition, optical caustics, behavior of the stock
market, buckling of elastic beams, population dynamics, and collective
ea
bargaining*
Thom categorises these applications as hard and soft applications and provides several examples from physics, biology, etc.

<9

^7Ibid,, p, 65,
These applications are discussed in E.C. Zeeman, "Applica
tions of Catastrophe Theory," Tokyo International Conference on Manifolds
{1973)} "Catastrophe Theory," op, cit.; "On the Unstable Behavior of
Stock Exchanges," Journal of Mathematical Economios 1, 1197U); C.A. 1snard and E.C. Zeeman, "Some Models from Catastrophe Theory in the Social
Sciences," op, cit.; T. Poston and A.S.R. Woodcock, "Zeeman's Catastro
phe Machine," Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical Society (197U), pp.
211-220; I. Stewart. "The Seven Elementary Catastrophes.” Mew Scientist
(Nov, 1975); L, Starobin, "Our Changing Evolution: Strategies for 19^0,"
General Systems 30CE (1976); W.S. Brown, "An Economic Application of
Catastrophe Theory," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Colorado
(1977), and T.A. OOLiva and C.M. Capdevielle, op. cit.
*9R. Thom (1977), op. cit.

TABLE I

CATASTROPHE

CONTROL
DIMENSIONS

BEHAVIOR
DIMENSIONS

FUNCTION

FIRST DERIVATIVE
x* - a

FOLD

1

1

to
a
g

CUSP

2

1

L * * - a x - ib x a

x3 - a - bx

s
O

SWALLOWTAIL

3

1

i
9

x4 - a - bx - cx2

BUTTERFLY

4

1

^ x* - ax - L bx1 - i cx3 - L dx*

xs - a - bx - cx* - dx2

HYPERBOLIC

3

2

x* + y* + ax + by + exy

3xl + a + ey
3y* + b + cx

ELLIPTIC

3

2

x, - x y * + a x + by + cxi + ey*

PARABOLIC

4

2

x*y + y* + ax + by + cx *+ d y *

£

to

o
_l

ffl
3

- a x - A bx* - -1 cx*
2
3

THE SEVEN ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHES
(Source: E..C, Zeeman, 1976)

3x* - y1 + a + 2cx
-2 x y + b + 2cy
2xy + a + 2cx
x* + 4y* + b + 2dy

Catastrophe theory is not without its share of critics*

The

catastrophe models and the underlying mathematics hare been sharply
criticised by a number of mathematicians.^0 Somewhat reminiscent of the
persistent attack on general systems theory, the criticisms are not un
expected.

Thom calls his theory a kind of geometrical vitalism; to him

catastrophe theory is more than mathematics.

It is a philosophy, a way

of looking at and describing the world which then demands its own mathe
matics: "Catastrophe theory is not a mathematical theory, rather it deals
with m a t h e m a t i c s * I t is not a scientific theory, but rather a method
leading to an art of models*
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DISCUSSION
According to Zeeman:^ "The proof of Thom's theorem is a dif
ficult one, but the results of the proof are relatively easy to compre
hend*

The elementary catastrophes themselves can be understood and

applied to problems in the sciences without reference to the proof."
This statement appears to have merit and the criticisms of catastrophe
theory may accordingly be classified into two kinds:

Criticisms that

deal with the mathematical foundations of the theory, and those that
deal with the effectiveness of the models.

The first type lies in the

domain of mathematicians and cannot be overcame at the application level;

60For a summary of these criticisms see G.B. Kolata, "Catas
trophe Theory: Hie Qnperor Has No Clothes," Science (April 1977)*
6h . Thom (1977), op. cit.
62
R. Thom (197$), op. cit., p. 323.
^E.C. Zeeman (1976), op. cit., p. 6$.

however, the effectiveness of the models nay be tested empirically.

Ibis

process Is consistent with the paradigm of scientific method, which is
empirical-inductive in nature*

The empirical validation exercises are

also consistent with the systems approach, which proceeds from the parti
cular to the general, and infers the design of the system by a process
of induction and synthesis*^
The interesting aspect of catastrophe -theory is that it is
qualitative and yet allows for dynamic investigation*

This means that

complex dynamic behavior can be modeled with only weak hypotheses*

Ac

cording to Than, "the type and dynamical origin of a catastrophe can be
described even when all the internal parameters describing the system
are not explicitly known,
Catastrophe models are perhaps the only ones that can handle
discontinuities and divergences in behavior.

For this reason alone,

their descriptive effectiveness appears to be superior as compared with
the existing models* However, an evaluation of catastrophe models would
have to be accomplished through some empirical validation exercises, not
by suppositions.
EXPLANATION OF THE CUSP CATASTROPHE MODEL
By far, the most publicised of the seven elementary catastro
phes is the cusp catastrophe, also known as the Riemann-Hugonio t catas
trophe*

The cusp model has been used to explain sudden changes in

^*J.P. van Gigch, Applied General Systems flieory (New York:
Harper and Row, Inc., 19710, pp. 10-11.
£t*
R. Thom (1975), op. cit., pp. 60-61.

behavior resulting from a two-dimensional control.
cusp model is derived as follows.^

Mathematically, the

Let

(1 )
where f(a,b,x) is the energy function,
x is the coordinate on the behavior space, and
a, b are the coordinates on the control space.
The behavior surface M is given by

(2 )

a - bx ■ 0
A singularity occurs when
- 3 x2 - b - 0

(3)

Equations (2) and (3; define the singularity set,which consists of two
folds.

Thus, the behavior surface has a fold curve F, in it, as shown

in Figure 7*

The projection of the fold curve F onto the control surface

is called the bifurcation set B,

The equation of B is given by elimi

nating x from equations (2) and (3):
2

27a'

ih)

Although F is a smooth curve, B has a cusp at the origin.
Zeeman^ has postulated that five properties characterise
phenomena that can be described by the cusp model:

^Adapted from C.A. Isnard and B.C. Zeeman, op. cit.
also B.C. Zeeman (1973)*op. cit,
^B.C. Zeeman (1976), op. cit,, p. 70.

See

FIGURE 7
THE CUSP MODEL
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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These properties may be identified as follows:
Consider a control point c - (a,b) along the path P1 on the
control surface.

If the control point c * (a,b) is outside the cusp

then fQ (the value of the energy function at c) has a unique minimum)
therefore M is single-sheeted over the outside of the cusp.

For

o - (a,b) inside the cusp, fQ has two minima separated by one maximum,
thus N is triple-sheeted inside the cusp.

However, the middle sheet is

mathematically irrelevant since it represents naxima of f , hence represents the inaccessible region for applications. The two minima repre
sent two possible modes of behavior (bimodality).

For example, a dog

both angry and fearful may either attack or retreat.
Suppose the control point c is moved smoothly along the path
P., the
behavior state x (the valueof x at o) follows smoothly along
I'
0
the upper surface until it reaches a point A ■ (-3,2,1) on the fold
curve, when it suddenly jumps to A* ■ (-3,2,-2) on the lower surface,
after which it proceeds smoothly along the lower surface.
phic change of behavior is called a sudden transition.

This catastro

A frightened dog

in a situation in which its rage steadily increases, may suddenly attack.
Figure VI shows the change in the sha^e of local energy function for
values of b - -3,-2,...3,
At b - -3, the behavior state has the unique minimum x^ • At
b - -2,a second minimum Xg appears, but equation (1) holds the state
in the first minimum Xj • Only when the second bifurcation occurs at

38
FIGURE VI

CHANGES IN THE SHAPE OF LOCAL ENERGY FUNCTION
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)

x

x
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b ■ 2, x1 becomes the maximum, and the equation (l) moves the state
rapidly to

If the control point is now moved along the path P1 in

the opposite direction, the return jump is delayed until b - *2,
delay, due to hysteresis, increases as *a* decreases.

This

This means that

the dog suddenly attacks or retreats at different combinations of rage
and fear.
The property of divergence can be observed by moving along
the paths P2 and Py

At the beginning of the paths, the behavior states

are close but are far apart at the end, P^ being on the lower surface
and P2 on the upper surface.

The two piths (which axe shown to be on the

either side of the cusp point) do not experience any discontinuity during
the movement.
68
Zeeman has invented a device called "catastrophe machine11
to explain the dynamics of the cusp catastrophe.

The underlying prin

ciple in the following description is that when the behavior of a system
is subject to opposing forces, the system seeks a state of equilibrium
at minimal energy.

The process which keeps the system in this equili

brium is called dynamic.

The catastrophe machine, illustrated in Figure
69
VII, has been analysed in detail by several authors.
The machine consists of a pivoted disc and two rubber bands

attached to the edge of the disc to provide opposing forces.

The free

end of one piece is fixed, while the other moves freely and is called

68
E.G. Zeeman, loo. cit.
^T. Poston and A.E.R. Woodcock, op. cit.; 1. Stewart, op. cit.;
E.C. Zeeman, op. cit.; W.S. Brown, op. cit.
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FIGURE VII
ZEEMAN'S CATASTROPHE MACHINE
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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the control point.

As this control point is moved in the plane of the

disc, there is & smooth movement of the equilibrium position of the
disc, with an occasional sudden jump in order to keep the potential ener
gy between the rubber bands at a minimum.

The positions of the control

point at which the jumps occur constitute the bifurcation set. As long
as the control point remains outside the cusp, the movement of the disc
varies smoothly and continuously as a function of the control parameters.
Even upon entering the bifurcation set, no sudden jump is observed.

How

ever, a catastrophe is certain to occur when the control point passes all
the way through the bifurcation set.

lhe cusp model of the catastrophe

machine is shown in Figure V U X corresponding to the cusp closest to the
disc.

The model is simply a three-dimensional graph of equilibrium

states z (angular positions of the diso) against the position of the
control point.
The folded behavior surface represents the equilibria (minima
of energy function).

If the control point lies outside the bifurcation

set, only one value of x

is possible; but if it lies within the bifur

cation set, then there are three values of x s one on the top sheet,
one in the middle, and one on the bottom sheet.

However, the dynamic

holds behavior finnly on the top and bottom sheets, thus the middle sheet
is said to be inaccessible.

The dynamic also causes catastrophic jumps

from one sheet to the other when the edge of the pleat is reached.
Within the bifurcation set, the values of x can be determined uniquely
only when the direction of movement of control point is known.

Stated

differently, the behavior is bimodal in same part of its range.

Also,

the jump from the top sheet of the behavior surface to the bottom sheet

FIGURE Till
CUSP MODEL OF THE CATASTROPHE MACHINE
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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does not take place at the same position as the jump from bottom sheet
to the top one, an effect called hysteresis*

The cusp model thus implies

the possibility of divergent behavior, that is, at the starting point
(singularity) of separation between the two behavior surfaces, the sys
tem is forced to adopt one of the two opposing behaviors*
AN APPLICATION OF THE CUSP MODEL TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SITUATIONS
70

Oliva and Capdevlelle

have attempted to map the important

structural characteristics of the Stagner-Rosen model onto the cusp catas
trophe*

This mapping is accomplished by establishing that the cusp

model end the Stagner-Rosen model are conceptually isomorphic.
1*

Bimodality? In the Stagner-Rosen model, the control di
mensions are the management and union demand intensi
ties, and the bargaining behavior of the system ranges
from lookout to strike* The bifurcation set, which is
defined by the management and union tolerance limits,
represents the bargaining zone. Formal negotiations
take place in this area of biraodality.

2*

Sudden transitions: During the formal negotiations, if
the management is acquiescent, unions demand intensity
is likely to Increase gradually* However, a lockout
would result if the management tolerance limit is ex
ceeded, indicative of sudden (catastrophic) transition
in the bargaining behavior of the system* On the other
hand, if the management is militant and the union ac
quiescent, a strike would result should the management
continue to press its demands beyond the union toler
ance limit*

3* hysteresis: The proceeding discussion indicates that
a strike would result if the union tolerance limit is
exceeded, and a lockout would result if the management
tolerance limit is exceeded. Stated differently,
strike and lockout occur at different conbinations of
union and demand intensities* Thus, catastrophic
jumps (strike and lockout) take place at different
70
T.A, Oliva and C.M. Capdevlelle, op* cit.

positions depending on the direction of movement
U«

Inaccessibility: During formal negotiations, the bar
gaining parties are expected to attempt to win as many
of their respective demands as possible. Therefore,
a state of neutrality in the bargaining behavior of
the system is not consistent with the concept of bar
gaining, and mould be the least likely behavior.

5.

Divergence: As demand intensities are increased by
both parties, formal bargaining begins. Ujpon reaching
a singularity, a small difference in the bargaining
behavior of the system would move the system onto
either the strike prone trajectory or the lockout
prone trajectory. Stated differently, feedback effects
begin to slowly change the demand intensities, which
can set the system on totally different courses.
Assuming that the proceeding arguments are correct, the collec

tive bargaining situation can be investigated using a cusp model.
model is illustrated for this application in Figure IX.

This

The bargaining

behavior surface is given by the following equation:
1? ■ a ♦ hx
where

15)

x is the bargaining behavior of the system,
a is the union demand intensity, and
b is the management demand intensity.
SUMMARY
Concepts relating to bargaining behavior in general and collec

tive bargaining behavior in particular were presented in this chapter,
and various models were discussed.

It was shown that the existing models

were not fully adequate in describing the dynamics of formal negotiations.
A new generation of models oalled catastrophe models were examined in
general, and the cusp catastrophe model in particular.

A conceptual iso

morphism between collective bargaining behavior phenomenon and the cusp
model was indicated as a possible approach to the investigation of the

FIGURE IX
CUSP MODEL FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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dynamics of formal negotiations*

It was suggested that such an investi

gation would also be Indicative of empirical verification of the useful
ness of the ouap model.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the research methodology and procedures
for the collection and analysis of data.

The cusp catastrophe model for

explaining the dynamic nature of collective bargaining behavior is re
stated and a simulation of the collective bargaining process Is described
as an approach to test the usefulness of the model.

In this context, the

working and formal hypotheses are stated and a measure of effectiveness
is indicated.

The method of data collection and the underlying proce

dures are described, including subject selection, experimental design,
and the simulation procedures for this research.
RESTATEMENT OF THE MODEL
Based on Stagner-Rosen description and recent advances In
catastrophe theory, a model for dealing with the dynamic aspects of
collective bargaining behavior was suggested in the proceeding chapter.
The model was derived by establishing an isomorphic relationship between
the Stagner-Rosen model and the cusp catastrophe model.

The Stagner-

Rosen model postulates that both bargaining parties have certain expecta
tions and tolerance limits which define a bargaining sonej as the parties
bargain, they explore these limits in an effort to find an area in which
a compromise is possible} and if these limits are exceeded, a strike or a
lockout may result.

The ousp catastrophe model recognises this coex
it?

lstence of divergent behaviors in a system and explains the abrupt changes
that semetines oocur In the system behavior by examining the cause and
effect relationships that exist In the system*
In a collective bargaining process the effect may be defined
as the bargaining behavior of the system*

At any given stage of formal

negotiations the system allows for divergent behavior*

That is, the

system may be assumed to exhibit a strike-prone behavior, or a lookoutprone behavior*

Further, the system may sometimes exhibit sudden transi

tions in its behavior indicative of failure of negotiations in the form
of a strike or a lockout*

Thus the effect may be defined as a continuum

of system behavior ranging from a strike to a lockout, with various
intermediate positions of strike-prone or lockout-prone behaviors*

The

cause may be defined in terms of control variables in the system sich as
management and union demand intensities (expectations).

The cusp model

attempts to explain the changes in the system behavior when the control
variables are gradually changed*
The effect or the system behavior Is represented in the cusp
model by a structurally stable topological surface (behavior surface)
with a fold curve in it*

The cause is a set of points (different combi

nations of the control variables) on a control surface.

The behavior

surface is derived from this set in accordance with the following causal
relationship:
xr3 - a + bx

(l)

where

x is the effect or the bargaining behavior of the system,

and a, b

are the control variables (pause), namely, the union and

management demand intensities respectively*

h9

The union and management tolerance limits are defined by the
limits of the bifurcation set on the control surface*

The area Inside

the bifurcation set (the cusp) thus identifies the bargaining sons*

In

this zone the system behavior is bimodal, that is, the system has two
possible modes of behavior, namely, strike-prone behavior and lockoutprone behavior*
If the control variables are gradually changed, there is a
smooth movement In the behavior surface either in a strike-prone trajec
tory or a lockout-prone trajectory*

At the origin of the cusp, very

small changes in the demand intensities can set the system on totally
different courses*

In this process, if the management is acquiescent,

the union demand intensity is likely to increase gradually until the
toleranoe limit of management is reached at which point a sudden transi
tion in the system behavior could occur in the form of a lockout*
Alternatively, if the union is acquiescent, a strike may eventually re
sult, should the management continue to press its demands past the union
tolerance limit*
To summarise, the cusp catastrophe model considers idle cause
and effect relationship between the demand intensities and the system
behavior for explaining the dynamic aspects of the collective bargaining
phenomenon.

The model attempts to explain divergent behavior and sudden

transitions of behavior of the system*
Although the model has been explained in the context of unionmanagement collective bargaining situations, it can be used to explain
other collective bargaining type situations as well*

For example, peace

negotiations in international disputes can be modeled using the same

$0
logic of presentation*

However, it is often difficult to devise a method

ology to test the model in real life situations*
One possible approach to verify the usefulness of the model is
through simulation of collective bargaining type situations in laboratory
environments*

Such simulations have their limitations, but serve as a

first step in systematically examining certain aspects of the model and
the dynamics of the process in general*

Hie methodology outlined in this

chapter involves a simulation of union-managemerrt collective bargaining*
This simulation, called Collective Bargaining Qame, is described in
Appendix A*
HYPOTHESES
The following working hypotheses concerning the impact of
union demand Intensity (a) and management demand intensity (bJ upon the
bargaining behavior of the system (x) were formulated for determining
the effectiveness of the cusp catastrophe model in simulated bargaining
situations:
Hypothesis 1:

If 'a* is constant or decreasing and 'b' is rising,
then the system will exhibit strike-prone behavior,
and an actual strike may eventually occur.

Hypothesis 2:

If >b' is constant or decreasing and 'a1 is rising,
then the system will exhibit lockout-prone behavior,
and an actual lockout may eventually occur*

Hypothesis 3:

If 'a1 and *b» are both constant or are both in
creasing or decreasing, then the system behavior
will change smoothly, but feedback effects nay
change *a' and/or 'b1 and induce behavior described
in hypotheses 1 or 2*

In order to support or fail to support these working hypotheses,
the following null hypothesis was formulated:

$■1

Noll hypothesis: The owp model Is a good fit for observed collective
bargaining behavior In simulated environment.
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
TO test the «mi hypothesis, the Chi-square test for goodness
of fit mas deployed.

This test is based on how good a fit there is

between the frequency of occurence of observations In an observed sample
(0) and the expected frequencies obtained from the hypothesised distribu
tion (e).

By comparing the observed frequencies with the corresponding

expected frequencies, it Is possible to decide whether discrepancies
between the two are likely to occur as a result of sampling fluctuations.
It is common practice to refer to each possible outcome of an experiment
as a cell.

Strike-prone behavior and lockout-prone behavior are the two

outcomes considered In this experiment.
Table H).

Thus, there are two cells (see
o
From the tabulated data, the quantity 5^ is computed (after

applying Tates' correction for continuity)!
?

C <1o< " e<1 - °**>2
(Corrected) ■ )
1
—

T

ei

where o^ and e^ are the observed and expected frequencies respectively,
for the ith cell, and has 1 degree of freedom.
If the observed frequencies are close to the corresponding
2
expected frequencies, the \ value will be small, Indicating a good fit.
If the observed frequencies differ considerably from the expected fre-

2

quenoies, the X. value will be large and the fit is poor.

A good fit

1

leads to the acceptance of the null hypothesis.
canoe of

,0% the critical value of \

For a level of signifi-

is found to be 3.31*1.

Thus,

$2

TABLE II
CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR GOODNESS OF FIT
]

Strike-Prone

1 Behavior

Observed frequency (o.)
x

i
i ,
{
i
i

1
Repeated frequency (e.)
X

!
i
•

Lockout-Prone
Behavior
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o
X. > 3.8U1 constitutes the critical region, and falls in the right tail
of the Chi-square distribution*

This criterion, however, should not be

used unless each of the expected frequencies is at least equal to 5*
THE METHOD OF DATA COLIBCTION
Objective
The objective is to gather data on management and union demand
intensities, and the bargaining behavior of the system in a simulated
collective bargaining process*
the form of indioies*

The data on the demand intensities take

These indicies and the simulation are described

in the following sections*
Definitions
tMon and Management Demand Intensities: These composite
indicies 'a* and <b' are developed as simple averages of the following
behavioral variables measured on a 11-point attitudinal scales
of success in winning demands,

extent

extent of emotional involvement in the

negotiations, extent to which concessions were made, extent of unwilling
ness to compromise, and extent of apprehension as to the equity of nego
tiations*

Thus, the demand intensities are different from a set of

demands. Additionally, the selection of components of demand intensities
is not of critical importance In determining the usefulness of the cusp
model, rather, the components need only be reasonable in a general sense*
For example, an entirely different set of behavioral variables could have
been selected, measured and averaged differently, without significantly
affecting the methodology*

Regression and other statistical techniques

are available for variable subset selection, but there are disagreements

5U
among the contributors In thia area on the measure of "goodness" of the
subset of variables selected.

The purpose here is not to define a uni

versally acceptable set of behavioral variables that constitute the
union and management demand Intensities*
The union demand Intensity is determined by multiplying the
average of the suggested variables by a factor of 1.5.

This factor is

based on -the union tolerance ratio of 2/3 suggested by diva and Capde
vlelle.1 However, this correction factor is not of critical importance
since the tolerance limits are believed to be elastic, but is helpful
in conducting sensitivity analysis.
Impge4w4wg Behavior of the System*

The expected bargaining

behavior of the system, 'e', is determined according to the working hypo
theses.

That is, during the formal negotiations,

(1) If 'a' is constant or decreasing, and 'b* Is rising, 'e»
would be strike-prone,
(2) if <b' Is constant or decreasing, and 'a* is rising, *e(
would be lockout-prone,
(3) if 'a1 and 'b1 are both unchanged, 'e' is determined
from the previous round of negotiations,
(U) If 'a' and *b' are both increasing, 'e' would be strikeprone if Increase in ’b* Is greater than increase in 'a1,
and lockout-prone If increase in 'a' is greater than
Increase in 'b',
(5) if 'a' and 'b' are both decreasing, ‘e 1 would be strikeprone If decrease in 'a1 Is greater than decrease in 'b',
and lookout-prone if decrease in 'b' is greater than
decrease in 'a', and
(6) if 'a* and 'b* are both increasing or decreasing at the
same rate, 'e' is determined from the previous round of
negotiations.
The observed bargaining behavior of the system 'o' is olaasi-

T.A, Oliva and C.M. Capdevlelle, "Collective Bargaining as a
Catastrophe Model," Revised paper presented at the Proceedings of Academy
of Management (1977b) (Itopublished),

fled as strike-prone or lookout-prone according to the observed outcome
of each round of formal negotiations.

Determinants of the observed out

come are, the perceptions of the subjects concerning the outcome (meas
ured on a 10-point attitudinal scale: 0-U - strike-prone behavior; 5-9 •
lookout-prone behavior) and the record of proceedings maintained during
the negotiations*
Instruments for Data Collection
The instruments for data collection consist of a collective
bargaining game and questionnaire on the progress of negotiations*

This

game consists of renegotiation of a hypothetical agreement (see Appendix
B) between pairs preselected subjects*

The questionnaire (see Appendix

C) provides data on the participants' demand intensities and the observed
behavior state of the system for each sample of hour-long round of formal
negotiations*
Subjects
Hie subjects for the experiment were lUO undergraduate students
enrolled in four sections of Management Principles and Policies course
at Louisiana State University.

Of these, 86 were male and 5U female,

between ages of 19 and U6, including full-time and part-time students,
the latter holding management, union or non-union jobs in various organi
zations*

The result was a rather heterogeneous sample*

The subjects

were induced to volunteer by offering them potential opportunities to
earn up to 15 per cent extra oredit in the course depending on their
success at negotiations plus the prospect of being exempted from their
final examination in the course if they were most successful*

lhe

56
subjects nere not offered any monetary remuneration.
The subjects mere told that they could volunteer for partici
pating in a collective bargaining game for extra credit in the course.
They mere required to take a psychological test before being assigned to
teams taking part in the game.

The game mas scheduled to be played

during the regularly scheduled class meetings and did not involve nega
tive rewards except perhaps in terms of lost opportunity to inprove their
grade in the course*

The purpose of the experiment and the criteria for

evaluating sucoess at negotiations mere not revealed to the subjects.
Experimental Design
The simulation consisted of 35 teams participating in the
collective bargaining game.

Each team had four subjects, two playing

the role of management representatives, and the other two playing the
role of union representatives.

Procedures for assignment of subjects

into teams are desoribed in the following sections.
Although the purpose of this experiment mas not aimed at dis
covering personality effects on oolleotive bargaining behavior, it mas
believed that some important functions mould be served if each of three
basic personality types, namely, n-achisvement, n-affiliation, and ndominance orientations, played each other in all possible combinations
(a 3 x 3 design).

A completely random assignment would have adequately

served the purpose, but the 3 x 3 design allows for blocking of certain
variables and rdduoes the variability in the experiment.

Also this de

sign mas believed to provide a representative sample to examine the
entire spectrum of collective bargaining behavior.

Same of the gaming

experiments aimed at Investigating personality effects on the collective
bargaining behavior of the system lend support to tbe belief that per
sonality orientations are at least a-priori determinants of the expected
2
bargaining behavior of the system.
Blocking
Personality Orientations: The design outlined above would
allow for blocking the secondary effects of personalities of single in
dividuals, since the collective bargaining game involves systemic con
figuration of personalities*

That is, if pairs of subjects of a certain

personality orientation were matched against every other types of pairs,
there would be reduced sampling bias*
Predisposition of Subjects: Bach personality type was subclassified as being high or low on n-nurturance and n-eococathection.
N-nurturanoe indicates an orientation toward compassion and sympathy for
less fortunate persons, while n-exocathection generally shows a practical
outlook with emphasis on results, wealth, position, and competition*
9uch subolassiflcations help to identify the predispositions of the sub
jects with regard to management or union activities on the assumption
that subjects are likely to have high n-nurturance if they sympathise
with union activities in general, and high n-exocathection subjects are
more likely to be biased in favor of management activities*

Accordingly,

pairs of subjects having high n-nurturanoe scores were designated as union
representatives'*

This procedure was believed to reduce the bias due to

2
Par more details see K.W. Terhune, "Motives, Situation, and
International Conflict Within Prisoner's Dilemma,11 Journal of Personality
and Social psychology. 8 (Mar* 1968).

the predispositions of the subjects on the nature of the experiment.
3ex: The effect of sex variable vas partially blocked by
forming all-male, all-female, and male-female combinations of teams for
the experiment.

Of the 3J> teams that took part In the experiment, 8 were

all-male, 6 were all-female, and 21 in different male-female combina
tions•
Motive Assessment and Grouping Procedures
The following personality orientations of the subjects were
measured by responses to a psychological insight test questionnaire^
(see Appendix D):
Primary Orientations:

1) Achievement (n-ach)
2) Affiliation (n-aff)
3) Dominance (n-dom)

Secondary Orientations:

U) Nurturance (n-nur)
f>) EXocathection (n-eoco)

Scoring of the questionnaires was done by averaging the scores on each
personality variable.

Thus, each subject was classified into one of the

following six groups:
Management Predisposition:

1) n-ach; n-eoco
2)
3)

Union Predisposition:

n-aff; n-eoco
n-dom; n-eoco

U) n-ach; n-nur
!>) n-aff; n-nur
6 ) n-dom; n-nur

The subjects were further classified as 'high1, 'average', or 'marginal'
examples of each orientation and also according to sex.

Pairs of subjects

Adapted from H.A. Murray ( e d . o r a t ions in Personality
(New York: Oxford Thiversity press, 1938), pp. 1U2-2U2; with permission
of the publisher (see Page U?).
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from the first three groups were matched with pairs of subjects from the
last three groups In nine possible ways, after allowing for blocking of
sex and individual personality effeots (see Table III),

The number of

teams in each cell are indicated in the table.
Simulation procedures
After the subjects had been grouped into teams, each team was
briefed on the collective bargaining game.

The experimenter remained

neutral and was unavailable for any consultations during the game.
The subjects were informed that the game oonslsted of formal
negotiations between pairs of preselected subjects on cm existing labor
contract. A H the teams negotiated simultaneously on 20 articles of
agreement in chronological order, taken one at a time.

Bargaining was

initiated with the statement of preferred solutions and continued until
a mutual agreement was reached.

The subjects were permitted to declare a

strike or a lockout if the negotiations failed. At the end of each
session, the two bargaining sides of each team independently reported
progress on negotiations by responding to a questionnaire (see Appendix
B),

This questionnaire provided data on a 11-point scale by assessing

the perceived demand Intensities of the management and union representa
tives, and the actual bargaining behavior of the system.

The subjeots

were not permitted to introduce additional articles to the existing agree
ment, that is, they negotiated only amendments to the existing articles.
To encourage active participation, the subjects were offered
payoffs in potential extra credit (up to 1$% of the final grade) and were
told that the most successful bargainers would be exempted from taking

TABLE III
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n-dcn

m m

i— — —
|
"
i
i
n-aoh
!
n-aff
J
n-dom
•
{
... ..... ___________________ ‘ ,, , , . - ™
•
i
_____ 3_____ i _____k ______ i _____
r
1
1
!
s
i p3
J1
s

J

____.3_____

L

____

A

____ i _____A _ J
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the final examination In the course.

The subjects were then given an

opportunity to ask questions on the briefing*
The game consisted of a maximum of ten 1-hour sessions, al
though most teams finished the game in less than eight sessions*

The

subjects were not given any feedback during the game on how successfully
they were negotiating*

Upon completion of the game, the extra credit

for the management and union sides of each team was announced (as also
the exeaptees from the final examination) and the subjects were debriefed
on the game*
SUMMARY
Wbrklng and formal hypotheses, and measure of effectiveness
for this research were stated in this chapter*

The method of data collec

tion and the underlying procedures were presented, outlining the experi
mental design and the simulation procedures*
The cusp catastrophe model was explained in the context of
collective bargaining situations*

This model considers the cause and

effect relationship between the demand intensities and the system behavior
for explaining some of the dynamic aspects of the collective bargaining
phenomenon, such as divergent behavior and sudden transitions in system
behavior, A simulation approach was suggested for verifying the useful
ness of the model.

This simulation called the collective bargaining game

was described and procedures for data collection were detailed to facili
tate testing of goodhess of fit of the model,
A 3 x 3 experimental design was outlined and the procedures
for subject selection, blocking, and the game were specified for imple-

mating data collection*

The results and findings of this research are

presented in the next chapter*

CHAPTER 17
RESULTS AMD FINDINGS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the data set, results, and findings
of this study*

First, the data set from the psychologlal insight test

is presented in summary form and explained in terms of personality orien
tations of subjects and the subject sources*

The composition of the 35

teams that took part in the simulation is also described.

Second, the

general results and the results of statistical analysis are presented*
The data set for the statistical analysis is included in the appendix*
Finally, the findings of the study are listed* A discussion of these
findings and the conclusions are Included in the next chapter*
SUBJECTS
Table 17 presents the mean personality orientation scores
by the three subject groups n-aohes, n-affs, and n-doms.

There were

HU, US, and U8 subjects in the three groups respectively.

The data did

not indicate any clearcut personality orientation as the subjeots made
significant scores on all of the orientations*

However, the subjeots

were classified into subject groups according to their highest score
among the three personality orientations*

Table 7 shows the composition

of the subject groups by different sections of data source*

Interesting

ly, the proportion of subject groups in each section did not appear to
be significantly different*

This aspect was also reflected in the

TABLE IV

MEAN PERSONALITY ORIENTATION SCORES B7 SUBJECT GROUPS

n-ach

n-aff

n-don

n-achee

3.70

1.89

1.99

(n ■ 1*1*)
n-affo

1.62

3.1*8

1.96

1.1*8

2.17

U.12

(» - 1*8)
n-dou
(n - 1*8)

TABLE 7
COMPOSITION OF SUBJECT GROUPS BY SECTIONS OF DATA SOURCE

n-ach

n-aff

n-dom

12

11*

11*

Section 2

8

12

12

Section 3

10

6

8

Section 1*

11*

16

11*

Total

1*1*

1*8

1*8

,

proportion of subjects in each group accounting for the two secondary
personality orientations, n-nurturance and n-axocatheotion.

The mean

scores on these secondary orientations by subject groups are shown in
Table VI.

It can be seen that scores on n-nurturance appeared to be

more pronounced than n-exocathection.
TABLE VI
MEAN SCORES ON SECONDARY ORIENTATIONS BT SUBJECT GROUPS

n-nur

n-exo

n-aohes

3.73

3.57

n-affs

1*,09

3.10

n-doras

3.51

3.U9

Based on the scores of the psychological insight test and
other design considerations desorlbed in Chapter III, the 11*0 subjects
were grouped into 35 teams.

Refer to Table H I in Chapter III for

the number of teams in each cell of the 3 x 3 design.
RESULTS
General Results
The teams were in session on the average for 7.37 rounds of
formal negotiations.

Four teams concluded negotiations in six rounds,

111 teams in seven rounds, and 17 teams in eight rounds.

The teans spent

on the average about 22 minutes on each artlole in the contract, the
most active bargaining being accounted for by the wage clause.

66

The affect of actual payoff on bargaining behavior was blooked
since the subjects were not told the breakdown of extra credit points
between the 20 articles of agreement*

They were also not informed the

criteria of evaluation of success at bargaining.

However, the subjects'

perceptions of the relative Importance of the various articles and the
corresponding payoff promoted active bargaining.

The actual payoff by

articles of agreement for the winning side of a team are presented in
Table VII.

There was no payoff for the losing side.

The criterion for

evaluating sucoess at negotiations depended on whether there was a
substantial shift In policy by either side from status quo.

For this

purpose, articles 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, and 19 In the existing
contract were assumed to be In favor of management, and articles 3, lU,
and 18 in union's favor.

Thus, In order to win one of the articles that

was a-priori in one's favor, it was only necessary to bargain for status
quo.

For the article on wages, however, this criterion was slightly modi

fied, that is, if the mutually agreed wage rates showed an increase of
less than 50 per cent over the existing rates, then management was deemed
to have been successful.
the winner.

An increase of over 50 per cent made the union

Based on these criteria, the records of proceedings were

examined and the payoff was computed for each team (see Table Till).
This table reveals that the union representatives were overall winners
in 22 teams, and the management representatives in 13 teams.

In terms

of the cells of the 3 x 3 design, this result is presented in Table IX.
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TABLE VII

PAYOFF SCHEDULE BY ARTICIBS OF AGREEMENT

Article
1
2
3
k
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1U
IS
16
17
18
19
20

Winner's payoff
2
0
2
0
S
0
0
1S
S
2
0
h
0
2
0
2
2
U
s
0
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TABLE VIII
PAYOFF EARNED BT TEAMS

Team
1
2
3
a
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
n*

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
2U
2$
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
31*
y>

Management
8
21*
23
20
2
9
28
12
12
15
20
12
27
20
18
20
17
30
1*2
30
35
20
15
20
28
39
3*
1*2
30
15
21
9
29
32
22

Union
1*2
26
27
30
1|8
U1
22
38
38
35
30
38
23
30
32
30
33
20
8
20
15
30
35
30
22
11
15
8
20
35
29
1*1
21
18
28

TABLE IX

WINNERS OP THE GAME BY PERSONALITY ORIENTATIONS

Cell

Management

Union

n-ach vs n-&eh
n-ach vs n-aff

0
0

3

$

n-ach vs n-dom

1

2

n-aff vs n-ach
n-aff vs n-aff

1

3
1

n-aff vs a-don

1

n-dan vs n-aeh

2

3
2

n-don vs n-aff

It

1

n-don vs n-don

2

2

2
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Results of Statlstioal Analysis
Table X (see Appendix B ) presents the data set showing the
union and management demand intensities, the expected and observed
bargaining behavior of the system for each sample.

The bargaining

behavior is indicated as either strike-prone 's', or lockout-prone 'l1.
Bach sample consisted of an hour-long round of negotiations.

Thus the

data set consisted of 258 samples, being the total of 6 to 8 hour-long
rounds of negotiations by each of the 35 teams.
The expected bargaining behavior was determined as follows:
If 'a* is Constant or decreasing, and 'b* is rising, 'o' would be strikeprone 's'.

For example, in sample 3, 'a' decreased from 11.1 to 10.5,

while 'b* increased from 5.0 to 6.1», thus *e' was classified as 's'.
If 'b* is constant or decreasing, and 'a' is rising, 's' would be lookoutprone <1'.

For example, in sample 2, »b* decreased from 6.U to 5*0,

while «a« increased from 10.8 to 11.1, thus 'e* was said to be 'I1.
If 'a* and 'bf are both unchanged, *e* would be determined from the
previous round of negotiations.

For example, In sample 22, ’a' and 'b*

were both unchanged, thus 'e' was determined from sample 21, which
happened to be 'l1* If 'a' and 'b' are both increasing, »e' would be
•s' if Increase in »b* is greater than increase in 'a*, and ’I' if
increase in 'a' is greater than increase in 'b'.

Consider sample 7

as an exajqple of '1', Where 'a' increased from 10.5 to 11.U, while *b*
increased by a lesser amount from lt.O to I*.2. Also notice sample 37
where ’s' was estimated on the basis of relative lnoreases in 'a* and *b'.
If 'a* and 'b* are both decreasing, 'e' would be 's' if decrease in 'a'
is greater than decrease In 'b', and

if decrease in 'b' is greater
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than decrease in 'a*.

For example, in sample 2£, 'a* decreased from

10.8 to 7*2, while 'b' decreased by a lesser amount from 8,0 to 6.6,
thus 'e* was classified as 's'.
situation.

Sample 28 is an example of the second

Finally, if 'a* and 'b' are both increasing or decreasing

at the same rate, *e* is determined from the previous round of negotia
tions.

For example, in sample 218, both 'a' and 'b* decreased by an

equal amount of 0.6, then ’e1 was estimated from sample 217, which
happened to be '1'.
The observed bargaining behavior was classified as 's' if
the teams scored it between aero and four, and '1* if the scores were
between five and nine.

This information was recorded at the end of

each round of negotiations.
Of the 2£8 samples, the observed frequency of strike-prone
behavior was 96, and 162 showed lockout-prone behavior.

The expected

frequencies were 112 and 1U6 respectively for strike-prone and lockoutprone behaviors (see Table XI).

applying the Chi-square significance

test it was found that the corrected X^had a value of 3.0£1 •
The data set was also classified h7 the two segments of the
behavior surfawe, the strike-prone surface and the lockout-prone surface.
The objective here was to test the two surfaces separately for goodnessof-fit.

Recalling the three working hypotheses listed in Chapter III,

the data points that conformed to hypothesis 1 and the relevant part of
hypothesis 3 were tabulated in terms of expeoted and observed frequencies.
These data points pertained to the strike-prone surface.
are shown in Table XU.

The results

Notice that the observed frequencies of strike-

prone behavior were £6 and 3£ for hypotheses 1 and 3 respectively, while

TABLE XX

CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR GOODNESS OF FIT

Strike-Prone
Behavior (s}

Lockout-Prone
Behavior (1)

Observed
Frequency (o^)

96

162

Sxpected
Frequency (e^)

112

11*6

Significance
Test

v ^
\

- 3.0*1

Significance
Level

m ,0?

Power of the
Test

- 90.1 %

TABLE XII

GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR STRIKE*PRONE SURFACE

hypothesis 1

hypothesis 3

Observed
Frequency (o^)

56

35

Expected
Frequency (e^)

72

Uo

Significance
Teat

Significance
level

X?■ 3.71*5
- .0?

7k

the expected frequencies were estimated to he 72 and UO.

Sir applying

the Chl-sqokre significance test it was found that the correeted X-?~
had a value of 3*7k$.
Dy a similar procedure, data points that conformed to hypothe
sis 2 and the relevant portion of hypothesis 3 were tabulated.
data points pertained to the lookout-prone surface.

These

The observed and

expected frequencies were 71, 7$, 76, and 70 respectively for the two
%•

hypotheses.

The corrected

had a value of 0.1*389 (see Table XIII).

Three instanoes of declared strike and two of lockout were
observed during the simulation.

In each of these oases the observed and

expected system behavior were identical.

These deadlocks were resolved

by the arbitrator, and the teams were allowed to continue negotiations.
FINDINGS
The results support the null hypothesis that the cusp model
is a good fit for observed collective bargaining behavior in simulated
bargaining situations.

The Chi-square significance teat indicated that

the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of the
two behavior states, the strike-prone and the lookout-prone behaviors,
are statistically insignificant.

The power of the test was 90.1 per cant.

The segments of the behavior surface.independently showed a good fit for
observed bargaining behavior, thus supporting all of the working hypothe
ses.

Further, in the five instances of failure of negotiations, the

observed and expected system behaviors were identical.

This result

indicated that the cusp model is effective in describing sudden transi
tions in system behavior.

TABLE XIII

GOODNESS 07 FIT TEST FOE LOCKOUT-PRONE SURFACE

Rypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Obaavved
Frequency (o^)

71

75

Expected
Frequency (e^)

76

70

Significance
Teat

- -U38?

Significance
Laval

- .0$
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It was observed that the cusp model was basically applicable
for individual data points in the data set.

Doe to the nature of

experimental design, these data points were discrete and mutually
exclusive,

the reasoning here is that since the negotiations did not

take place continuously over time, being scheduled at week-long intervals
and since the subjects discussed different articles of agreement in
different rounds, the system behavior could not be tracked over the
duration of the game by individual teams in order to observe catastrophic
changes in behavior.

It would have been necessary for the experimenter

to manipulate the control variables 'a', and *b' over time (a steady
increase or decrease of one or both of the variables) to facilitate
a smooth movement on the behavior surface leading to a catastrophe.
Furthermore, the initial conditions of the simulation stipulated that
the movement on the control surface started at the origin of the cusp,
which made it difficult to determine the direotion of movement of the
control point.

Ideally, if the control point is moved from outside the

bifurcation set into and across the cusp, a smooth movement on the
behavior surface leading to a catastrophe could be observed.
However, an attempt was made to track the five observed
catastrophes to observe the treads in system behavior over time.
As expected, the movement on the behavior surface was not smooth and
consistant results were not observed.

Thus one of the findings is

that a smooth and continuous movement of the control point is necessary
to plot the system behavior over time.
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The results were supportive of the Stagner-Rosen model for
collective bargaining behavior*

This finding was supported by the fact

that although the system behavior was either strike-prone or lookoutprone, mutual agreement was possible in an area of compromise.
The results appeared to indicate that perceptions about the
potential payoff were reflected in the demand intensity patterns of the
subjects, which in turn influenced the system behavior.

The effect of

personality orientations on the system behavior indicated some pattern
of consistency, but no hypotheses were tested to ascertain the degree
of consistency.
SUMMARY
The results and findings of the study were presented in this
chapter.

A data set of 2<>8 samples was analysed to determine the good-

ness-of fit of the cusp model in simulated bargaining situations.

The

results revealed that there was a good fit.
Some general results and the results of the psychological
Insight test ware also included in the chapter.

The results related to

the outcome of the simulation, payoff earned by various teams, and the
personality orientations of the winners in each team.
not tested for statistical significance.

These results were

A discussion of the findings

and the conclusions of the study are presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND HKCOKMKNDATIONS
DISCUSSION
The results appear to show that experimental verification of
the descriptive effectiveness of catastrophe models can successfully b e
undertaken.

It was shown that the cusp model Is a good fit for observed

bargaining behavior in laboratory environments.

Although the results

pertained to laboratory type of situations, it Is believed that the cusp
nodal oould be used to

all types of bargaining behavior.

The cusp nodel appeared to be superior to the existing des
criptive and normative nodels.

first, the ousp nodal Is mathematically

elegant and can deal with nnlti-valuadness of variables*

Seeond, it is

a dynamic nodel and permits simulations to be conducted.

This aspect

nay have implications for policy formulation.

In this sense, the ousp

nodel has potential to be used as a normative model. As a descriptive
model, it is effective In describing phenomena involving sudden transi
tions*

Finally, the model is based on sound scientific logic, on as

sumptions that do not appear to be unrealistic, and nay be verified with
relatively weak hypotheses*

The nodel is both qualitative and quanti

tative.
Being one of the first attanpts at empirical investigation of
catastrophe models In the field of social sciences, it is difficult to
evaluate tine Impact of this study on a comparative basis*
78

All that can
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be said at this stage is that the cusp model has considerable potential
in describing phenomena involving sadden transitions•
The data implied frequent movement from the strike-prone sur
face to the lockout-prone surface, and vice versa.

This implication may

erroneously suggest that catastrophic changes of behavior occur in the
system rather frequently.

However, a closer look at the description ol

the collective bargaining game Indicates that the different rounds of
negotiations were scheduled at week-long intervals,therefore each round
had to be construed as a discrete data point.

The subjects discussed

different articles of the contract in different rounds.

Therefore, the

model was pertinent to each round rather than the entire game.
sense, the rounds of negotiations were mutually exclusive,

In this

Accordingly,

except in *> oases out of 2?8, catastrophes were not observed.
The effect of payoff and personality orientations were not
tested statistically.

This does not pose a serious problem since the

methodology permits use of any given set of variables.

This explanation

also serves to counter any criticisms that may arise as to the effective
ness/adequacy of the consonants of the control variables 'a' and 'b'.
Another possible criticism concerns the choice of dichotomous
behavior states, the strike-prone and the lookout-prone behaviors.

The

choice of dichotomous behavior states is a very Important feature of this
study since the cusp model, by definition, allows only two stable behavior
states.

However, the findings Indicate that strlke-proneness or lockout-

promaness does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of mutual agree
ment in the foem of a compromise solution.

Such solutions may be reached
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far various reasons,

the Implication here is that the system behavior

could be strike-prone or lookout-prone even when there is mutual agree
ment.

This finding provides a possible explanation as to why the nego

tiators sometimes experience dissonance and dissatisfaction at the
solutions they agreed upon.

This possibility is not reoognised in the

Stagner-Rosen model.
The payoff system used in the simulation is rather difficult
to defend. Host researchers prefer to use monetary remuneration for
payoff in gaming experiments.

The use of extra credit points for motiv

ating the euhjeots to participate in the game was based on the supposi
tion that given an opportunity a student would like to make the best
possible grade in the course. A review of the records of proceedings of
the various teams that took part in the game appeared to support this
supposition.
The major value of the results is in the relative success at
validation of a complex model for a complex process.

The cusp model was

shown to be of operational value in application situations*

More spe

cifically, the cusp model appears to hare considerable potential in the
modelling of conflict processes.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Some treads do emerge from this study which give direction to
constructing a new methodology for describing conflict processes.

Based

on the results it would appear that the ousp model adds a new dimension
to the existing descriptive and normative models of collective bargain
ing type behavior.

While the results cannot be interpreted to provide
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any specific measures of accuracy, the chances of obtaining inaccurate
descriptions would be smaller.

The experimental design and sample sise

of 2^8 taken In this study can only be construed to indicate the possible
usefulness of the cuep nodel but cannot provide conclusive evidence to
establish its superiority over other models*

liras, based on the United

results of this study, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions re
garding the degree of superiority of the cusp nodel over other models*
What is warranted from the results Is the continuation of additional
studies involving the ousp model*
Further study of the ousp model using much larger sample sices
and alternative designs might establish the descriptive effectiveness of
the cusp model more conclusively*

Also, more realistic results could be

obtained by gathering data from real-life situations than from simulated
situations, as well as situations where system behavior is tracked over
tine*

The validity of results of this study may have been inhibited by

the use of undergraduate students as surrogates for union and nanagement
representatives*

However, it must be noted that the feasibility of field

studies involving managers and union representatives appears to be rather
limited because of the extreme difficulty involved in monitoring the
bargaining process and the probe effects*

Furthermore, if the cusp model

should not prove useful, it nay not mean catastrophe theory is not valid*
The cusp model is restricted to two independent variables and
two behavior states*

Further work in a higher dimensional space might

be of more practical value*

For example, the butterfly catastrophe model

has four independent variables and three stable behavior states*
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Zeeman1 boa suggested an application of the butterfly nodel in wage bar
gaining situations.
2
The butterfly nodel is derived aa foilova t Let

f(a,b,c,d,x) - V 6 x6 - ax - 1/2 hoc2 - 1/3 ex3 - 1 A d*1*

(1)

where f(a,b,e,d,x,} is the energy function, x ia the coordinate on
the behavioral apace, and a,b,c,d are coordinates on the control space.
The behavior surface M ia given by
» X** - a - bx - ca? - dx3 -

0

(2)

The four control factors are called
a
b
c
d

■
■
»
-

Bernal factor (union denand intensity),
Splitting factor (management denand intensity),
Bias factor (position in the firm), and
Butterfly factor (tine),

When the butterfly factor is negative (d < 0) then the
swamps the x^ term, forming a cusp.

tern

Theeffect of the biasfactor o

merely to bias the position of the cusp.

is

When the butterflyfactorbe

comes positive (d > 0) then the x^ tern conflicts with the x^ tern and
causes the cusp to bifurcate into three cusps enclosing a pocket.
This pocket corresponds to the emergence of a third stable
behavior state and represents a compromise behavior midway between the
two extremes behaviors represented by the upper and lower surfaces of the
cusp (see Figure X).

In the wage bargaining situation, the individuals

'Ht.C. Zeenan, "Catastrophe Theory," Scientific American (April,
1976). See also by the sane author, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory,"
Triqro International Conference on Manifolds (1973).
2Adapted fron E.C. Zeenan, ibid. The notation is quite similar
to one used in deriving the cusp model in Chapter II.
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FIGURE I
THE BUTTERFLY MODEL

CUSP-SHAPED
D POCKET OF
f COMPROMISE
i BEHAVIOR

EXTREME
NEGATIVE
BEHAVIOR

POCKET

V >

SPACE
0
0

b

EXTREME
POSITIVE
BEHAVIOR

in the firm are represented by a cloud of points on the behavior surfaoe
moring steadily In the direction of tins.

For t < 0 the cusp catas

trophe represents the polarisation of opinion between the union1a demands
and masagegnsnb's offer.

For t > 0 the compromise pocket emerges and

as tine progresses the pocket grows and more individuals fall into the
pocket, that is, experience the catastrophe from an extreme opinion to
the compromise opinion*

For a given value of bias, the compromise opinion

differs sharply from the extreme opinions*

A wage bargain Is struck when

sufficient individuals fall into the pookst*
A preliminary study was conducted to examine the above des
cription using a methodology similar to the one described in Chapter IXL
A simulation called wage Bargaining Qame was designed to study the good
ness of fit of the butterfly model in simulated wage bargaining situa
tions (see Appendix F).

The objective here was to verify the emergence

of the third stable behavior state representing compromise behavior*
Accordingly, the data were collected in successive rounds of negotiations
on the number of subjects moving toward compromise behavior*
at t*l, t*2 and t-3 are presented in Table XI7*

The results

The expected number of

subjects moving toward compromise behavior was estimated on the basis of
the bias factor, for example, at t - 1, all those representing positions
above the rank of supervisor were expected to vote for a compromise.

The

observed number of subjects moving toward compromise behavior was deter
mined from the ballots that were cast at the end of each round*
The results were encouraging and indicated that the butterfly
model was a good fit in wage bargaining situations In simulated environ
ments.

The corrected ^

values of 3*1*37, 0*061*3, and 2.752 at t * 1,2,3
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TABLE XIV

GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR THE BUTTERFLY MODEL

Butterfly
Factor (t)

nrequwMy

Compromise

No Coraprood.se

1

Observed (on )
Expected (e^ )

1*5
35

95
105

2

Observed (o.g)
Expected (e^2)

68
70

72
70

3

Observed (o.,)
Expected (ejJ)

Uli
105

26
35

Significance
Tost

Xt-i
^

■ 3.U37

2
t»2

2
X*"3

0.06U3

’

2.752

Significance
Level

-

.05

Power of the
Test

m

.721*
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respectively ware not statistically significant.

However, the power of

the test was only 72*U per cent, being accounted by the relatively small
sanple else of ll|0. This limited finding strongly suggested the need for
farther research In this area on a larger seals*
Farther Improvement of the experimental design is warranted In
future research. The Thematic Apperception Test would be a more precise
instrument for measuring personality orientation of the subjects.

Although

a design based on personality orientation appears to be more elegant, a
completely random assignment of subjects into teams might provide some
insight Into the extent of personality effects upon bargaining behavior.
Also, selection of subjects from a source other than student population
might lend greater validity to the results*

The simulation could be de

signed so as to allow plotting of the catastrophes over time.

Finally,

monetary payoff schedules and large sample sizes would lend greater credi
bility to the results and findings*
SUHM&RT
In any event, the existing models have some limitations in
describing collective bargaining type behavior.

The descriptive models

appeared to be static, and there appear to be controversies about rele
vance of game-theoretic conclusions to collective bargaining type situa
tions*

Furthermore, these models appear to be less effective in dealing

with sadden Changes in behavior*

Thus, the catastrophe models appear to

be more appropriate for studying confliot processes*

Further research on

the validity of these models would be useful and nay have relevance in
many fields*
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n * main thrust of this study boo been to suggest a tool for
use by the system scientists, social scientists, and students of bargain
ing behavior.

For this purpose, some of the catastrophe models have been

described, A methodology was outlined for testing the descriptive effec
tiveness of one of the models (the cusp model).

However, further study

on a much larger scale would be helpful in making these models opera
tional in a practical sense. This preliminary study has clearly demons
trated the need for more definitive research on the usefulness of catas
trophe models.

Hopefully, it is the first step in the attempt at empiri

cal verifications of the value of same of the catastrophe models in
business research.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Barnard. C, the Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard university Press, !?5SI
Cassel, F# H. and Baron, J. J. Collective Bargaining in the Public Seotor. Columbus: Urld, lac*, 1975*
Davis, K, Homan Behavior at Work. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
19727
Fouraker, L. E. and Siegel, S. Bargaining Behavior.
Hill Book Coopany, Inc*, 1965*
Gellerman, S, W. Managers and Subordinates*
Dryden press, 197b*

New York: McGraw-

Hinsdale, Illinois*

The

Haspton, D. R.j Summer, C. E.: and Webber, R. A. Qfrganiaatlonal Behavior
and the Practice of Management, Glenview. Illinois: Scott, Fores5an“and Company, 1973. ---Hicks, H* O* and Gullet, C* R. the Management of Organisations. 3rd,
ed* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 197&*
Isnard, C, A* and Zeenan, E. .C, "Some Models from Catastrophe Theory in
the Social Sciences,1* in Collins, C. (ed*), the Use of Models in
the Social Sciences. Boulder, Colorado* Wsatview Press, 1976,
Levinson, H. M. Determining Fbroes in Collective Bargaining* Hew York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19^6.
March. J* and Simon. H,
Inc., 1958.

Organizations,
-----

Hew York: John Wiley and Sons,

Msgginaon, L. C. Personnel: A Behavioral Approach to Administration.
Homewood, Illinois* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972,
Megginaon, L. C* Personnel and Huaan Resources Administration*
wood, Illinois: Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1977*

Home

Miner, J. B. and Miner, M, G. Personnel cuad Industrial Relations: A
Managerial Approach. New York: MacMillan and Corapa^, LtdT,^L973*
Murray, H. A. (ed.) Explorations in Personality. New York: Oxford
University Press, 193B.
88

Pigou, A. C. The Economics of Waifare. Uth ed,
Cacpany, Ltd., 1933.

London: MacMillan and

Poston, T, and Stewart, X. "Thom's Classification Theorem: intuitive
Approach," in Poston, T, and Stewart, I. (eds.), Taylor Expansions
and Catastrophes. Belmont, California: Pitman Publishing Corpora*
tibn, 1976.
Rapoport, A, "Conflict Resolution in Light of Game Theory," in Swingle,
P. (ed,), The Structure of Conflict, New York: Academic Press,
1970,
Rapoport, A, (ed,) Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution.
Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 197U.
Rapoport, A.| Guysr, M. J.: and Gordon, D* G, The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbcr:
The University of Michigan Press, 1976.
Scott, W. J, and Mitchell, T. R. Organization Theory: A Structural and
Behavioral Analysis. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,

19751
Siegel, S,j Siegel, A, E.j and Andrews, J. M. Choice, strategy and Uti
lity. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., i961u
Slichter, S. H.) Haaly, J, J.; and Livernash, E. R. The Impact of Collec
tive Bargainingon Management. Washington, D.C.: The BrooWings
Institution, i960.
Stagner, R, and Rosen, H. Psychology of Ifaion-Mawagement Relations.
Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 196£.
Sutherland, J. W.
Systems: Analysis. Administration, and Architecture.
New York: von Nostrand Relnhold Company, 197%
Thom, R. structural Stability and Morphogenesis. Reading, Massachusetts:
W. A. Benjamin, Inc., 1975.
Van Gigon, J. P. Applied General systems Theory. New York: Harper and
Row, Inc., I§7lu
Von Neumann, J* and Morgenstern, 0. The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19U7.
_
Walton, R. E, and McKersis, R. B. A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotia
tions. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.
Wortman, M. S. and Randle, C. W. Collective Bargaining Principles and
Practice. Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1966,

90
PERIODICALS
Alexander, J, M. and Saaty, T. L« "The Forward and Backward Process of
Conflict Analysis." Behavioral Science 22 (1977)*
Bonoma, T. V. "Conflict, Cooperation and Trust in Three Power Systems."
Behavioral Science 21 (1976).
Brown, E. R. "The Effects of Need to Maintain Face on Interpersonal
Bargaining." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology h (Maroh

1968)
.

Brown, W. 3. "An Economic Application of Catastrophe Theory.n Unpub
lished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Colorado (1977).
Chertkoff, J. M, and Ksser,J. K. "A Review of Experiments in Explicit
Bargaining." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 12 (1976).
Druokman, 0. and Bonoma, T. V. "Determinants of Bargaining Behavior in
Bilateral Monopoly Situation lit Opponent's Concession Rate and
Similarity." Behavioral Science 21 (1976).
Felsenthal, D. %
"Bargaining Behavior When Profits are Unequal and
Losses are Equal." Behavioral science 22 (1977).
Gerhart, P. F. "Determinants of Bargaining Outcomes in Local Government
labor Negotiations•" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 29
CL976).
“
"
Harsanyi, J. C. "Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in
Cooperative and Non-cooperative Games." Management Science 9

(1962).

Kochan, T. A. and Wheeler, H. N. "Municipal Collective Bargaining."
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 29 (1975).
Kolata, G. B. "Catastrophe Theory:
Science (April 1977)

The Qnperor Has No Clothes."

LaTour, Sj Houlden, P.; walker, L»; and Thibaut, J. "Sons Determinants
of Preference Modes of Conflict Resolution." Journal of Confliot
Resolution 20 (1976).
Megginson, L. C. and Oullett, C. R. "A Predictive Model of Union-Management Conflict." Personnel Journal (June 1970)
Nash, J. F,

"The Bargaining Problem."

Eoononetrica 18 (1950).

Nash, J. F. "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games." Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences (U.S.A.) 36 (1950).

91
Hjrdegger, R. V. "Independent Utility Scaling and the Has Bargaining
Model," Behavioral Solenee 22 (1977)*
Oliva, T, A. and Gapdevlelle, C, M. "Collective Bargaining as a Catas
trophe Model," Proceedings of the Academy of Management (1977a).
Oliva, T, A, and Gapdevlelle, C. M. "Collective Bargaining as a Catas
trophe Model," Revised paper presented at Proceedings of the
loader of Management (1977b), (Un published)
Patchen, M* "Models of Cooperation and Conflict: A Critical Review,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, XU (1970),
Poston, T, and Woodcock, A, E, B, "Zeeman's Catastrophe Machine,"
Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical Society (197U).
Scodel, A,| Minas, J, S,: Ratoosh, P.; and Ilpets, M, "Some Desorlptive
Aspects of Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Games•" Journal of Conflict
Resolution 3 (1959)#
Simaan, M, and Crus, J. B., Jr, "Nash Equilibrium Strategies for the
Problem of Armament Control," Management Science 22 (197?)
Starobin, L, "Our Changing Evolution: Strategies for I960," General
Systems XXI (1976),
Stewart, I, "The Seven Elementary Catastrophes,"
ber 197?).

New Scientist (Novem

Terhune, K, W. "Motives, Situation, and International Conflict Within
Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 (March 1968),
Terhune, K. W. "Wash-in, wash-out and Systemic Effects in Extended
Prisoner's Dilemma,11 Journal of Conflict Resolution 18 (197U),
Thom, R, "Catastrophe Theory and its Applications." Pasqualle Porcelli
Memorial Lecture (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University,
June 16, 1977),
Wteton, R, E. and McKersie, R, B, "The Theory of Bargaining," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review (April 1966),
Yukl, G, A, "Effects of Opponent's Initial Offer,"
ty and Social Psychology 30 (197U).

Journal of Personali

Zeeman, E, C. "Applications of Catastrophe Theory,"
Conference on Manifolds, (1973).

Tokyo International

Zeeman E. C* "On the Unstable Behavior of Stock Exohanges."
of Mathematical Economics 1 (197h).
Zeeman. E, C.

Journal

"Catastropby Theory." Scientific American (April 1976).

APPENDIXES

9h
APPENDIX A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING QAME

The game is played by tecuos of four* Two members are designated to
play the role of management representatives and the other two, union re
presentatives, The game consists of renegotiating an existing union
contract (Appendix BJ. The conbraot has 20 articles and each article
will be considered in chronological order, taken one at a time. Bargain
ing is initiated with the statement of preferred solutions and continues
until a mutual agreement is reached# During the negotiations, teams are
permitted to adjourn for consultations# If the teams adjourn three times
without reaching an agreement, the negotiations are deemed to have failed#
This failure nay take the form of a declaration of a strike or a lock
out# If the teams reach mutual agreement on all of the 20 articles, or
if the negotiations break down, the game is over for the respective teams#
Except under unusual circumstances, a lyj"1™ of 10 one-hour sessions
will be allowed for the game, and the participants nay not introduce ad
ditional articles to the existing agreement, l#e#, they negotiate only
amendments to the existing articles#
At the end of each round of negotiations, the teams are required to
provide the following information to the experimenter:
1) A stannary of proceedings during the round, indicating number of
articles discussed, the Initial demands on each article by
management and union, and the mutually acceptable solution (if
reached). Should there be a breakdown of negotiations, the
last positions of the management and union must be indicated,
2)

The management and union representatives separately fill out a
questionnaire (Appendix C) at the end of each round#

3)

At the end of the game, the teams reportthe changes in the
existing agreement, if any, that are mutually agreed upon, and
the actual result of the game# The actual result could take
idle form of a mutual agreement or a declaration of strike/lock
out#

The game is triggered after the participants have examined the exist
ing agreement and formulated their respective overall strategies. The
management and union representatives are encouraged to write down their
maxiaim and miniman acceptable demands on each article, along with argu
ments favoring these demands# For this purpose, the participants are
encouraged to oite current industry and other socio-teohnical data. Pay
off schedule for the participants is as follows:
1)

A maximum of £0 points of extra credit may be earned by the
participants by winning their respective demands during the
negotiations# For this purpose, each article in the agree
ment has a potential payoff#
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2) A maximum of 30 points will be awarded as a bonus credit for
the overall winning side of each team*
3) A maximum of 20 points will be awarded to all participants for
the reports they make during and after the game*
U)

The most suooeaaful pair of bargainers in the class will be
exeapted from the final examination in Management 3159*

£) In ease of breakdown of negotiations, as in the cases of de
claration of strike or lockout, the amount of extra credit
that the participants may be elegible for will be determined
by an arbitrator* Professor T*A* Oliva, Department of Manage
ment, has kindly agreed to be the arbitrator*
6)

The extra credit earned in this project may not exceed l£ per
cent of the final grade in the semester*
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APPENDIX B
AGREEMENT
ABO CORPORATION, Baton Rouge, herein individually referred to as the
MCompany", and collectively as the "employer," and ABC WORKERS UNION,
herein referred to &a the "Union," agree as follows:
Article I d : Coverage
The bargaining unit is made up of all production and maintenance employees
of the employer, excluding professional, managerial, supervisory, and
clerical employees.
Article 1021 Term
The term of this agreement begins on April 1, 1976, and continues through
March 31, 1978, On. or before February l, 1978, one party officially
notifies the other party, in writing, that it wants to end it.
Article 1031 Recognition of Union and Management Functions
The employer recognises the union as the exclusive representative of all
employees covered by this agreement for the purpose of collective bargain
ing with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment. Die union recognises that the employer has the
right,.on its own Initiative, to perform any function of management at
any tine, so long as it does not violate any provision of this agreement.
Article IQUi Tfork stoppages
There shall be no lookouts or strikes under any circumstances during the
term of this agreement.
Article 10$: Grievance Procedure
A claim that the company has violated this agreement is forfeited unless
it is presented within 10 calendar days after the alleged violation oc
curs. This is true even though a continuing violation is alleged. Union
may present the grievance in writing to the department head concerned.
If the department head does not hear the grievance within 10 days after
the request, the union may arrange a conference with the manager. The
answer made by the company must be in writting. The company's answer is
final and binding, and no provisions for appeal or arbitration are pro
vided herein.
Article 106: Order must be obeyed
When an employee feels aggrieved because of an order, he shall neverthe
less obey the order, provided it does not involve serious danger to life.
Article 107: Holidays
The following days are on holiday list:

New Year's Day, Good Friday,
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Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christ
ina Day* An employee Is eleglble for holiday benefits unless he is
absent without permission or Is on leave of absence. The company may
decide which Jobs normally operate and which jobs normally close down on
holidays*
Article 108: Pay
In the normal oircmastanees, each employee shall be paid his rate In the
classification he is working for all time payable*
Classification

Rate/hour

Auto mechanic
Machinist
Carpenter
Helper
Millwright
Operator
Pipefitter
Vfelder

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1»*38
U.38
U.38
2*75
U*38
U.38
U.38
U.38

Except where this agreement says otherwise, straight time shall be payable
for time worked, and when absent for these reasons:
1) Death in the family
2) Conferring wild) management
3) Vacation
Article 109: Overtime
Time and one-half shall be payable after the UO-hour period In a work
week* The employer may schedule an employee for overtime work with or
without prior notice* In the normal circumstances, such overtime is
worked after eight hours have been worked In the day*
Article 110: Hours
The workweek is a period of five consecutive days beginning with Monday*
The working period is 7:U*> a*m* to U:l£ p#m* with a 30 minutes lunch
break* In unusual circumstances, the employer may change the workweek
and the working period*
Article 111: Service
In the normal circumstances, an employee's service accumulates in his
regular classification*
Article 112; Conditions which temporarily interrupt service
An employee is absent under conditions which temporarily interrupt service
when he Is absent from work, unless the absence is with permission, Is
followed by a return to work without interruption of employee status and
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appears on tne following list:
1) An absense Which has continued for not more than 10
consecutive calendar days.
2) An absence for active military service,
3) An absence while on loan by the company.
k ) An absence for sickness or accident of the employee,
provided a doctor certifies that the absence is
necessary.
5) An absence for vacation.
Article 113: Proof of service
in computing service, the records of personnel administration department
shall be conclusive.
Article lllit Seniority
One employee has higher job service than another employee if
1) He has longer service of the kind in question, or
2) Service of the kind in question is equal, and he has more service
of the highest lower kind.
For purposes of determining seniority, all classifications are considered
equal.
Article 115 s Qualification
It is the function of management to fix the qualifications for each job
and post, The determination of abilities and qualifications of an em
ployee shall be made by the company. The company may select an employee
of less seniority for a higher job on the basis of ability and qualifi
cations rather than on the basis of seniority alone.
Article 116: Layoff
Before laying off employees, the company will notify the union of the
impending layoff at least one month before its effective date. Employees
scheduled for layoff will be permitted to voluntarily retire, provided
they can qualify for early retirement, or voluntarily resign and receive
severance pay.
Article 117: Assignment
It is the function of management to assign employees to jobs, classifica
tions, training, and transfer. Such assignments shall be made by the
company based on abilities, qualifications, seniority, and prevailing
circumstances.
Article 1181 Vacation
An employee is eleglble for vacation during a particular calendar year if
his total service since the date of his employment or reinstatement is

one year or more. An eligible employee Is entitled to at least two weeks
of vacation as follows:
Tears of total service
less than f>
$

10
20

'Masks of vacation
2-------3
k
$

The vacation shall he scheduled according to a preselected vacation list
in one period, except in unusual circumstances* Deadline for making
selections shall be April 1 of each year* Weekends and holidays shall
not be excluded from vacation period. When the calendar year ends, the
employee loses all of the vacation he has not yet taken. In unusual
circumstances, the company may recall an employee on vacation.
Article 119: Miscellaneous
The company may discipline an employee if he commits one of the posted
offenses, with or without advance notice. Bren though an employee does
not commit a posted offence, his conduct or work performance may still
be a cause for discipline. When the company disciplines an employee, it
may lqpoBe any penalty which it deems appropriate. If the penalty imposed
is discharge or suspension in excess of 10 working days, the employee may
appeal to determine if the penalty was Imposed after due process; however,
reasonableness of penalty itself will not constitute ground for appeal.
Neither the company nor the union shall discriminate against any employee
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin or because of
membership or nommemberahip in any labor organisation. The company will
also not discriminate or penalise in any way any union representative or
any member of the bargaining unit because of any action taken by him in
pursuant to the provisions of this agreement.
Article 120: Benefit plan
Nothing in this agreement shall affect the company's benefit plan (a.
Annuity plan; b. long-term disability insurance plan; c. Accidental death
benefit plan; d. Contributory group life insurance plan; e. Family health
insurance plan) or the administration thereof. The union waives its
rights to bargain the provisions of the company's benefit plan.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this agreement to be executed
at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this 31st day of March, 1976.
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Wttneaeea:
(gjgned)________________

ABC Corporation. Baton Rouge
Bjjr

(signed)
Manager

(yicmad')

Assistant Manager

t.,.— n ________________

— Ksnasa
Secretary-Treasurer
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APPENDIX C
PROGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS
Teaa # __ __ ___

Names: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Hound # _ _ _ _ _

Date:

Directions: Read each of the following questions carefully and evaluate
the day's progress by placing an x on the scales given (.0 - to no
extent, £ * to some extent, and 10
- to a verygreat extent):
0 1 2

3 H

6

7 8 9 10

1* To what aafteat were you successful in winning your demands? . . • . _ _ _ ____________________
2, To what extent did you hare to
make concessions during this round?
3* How would you evaluate your un
willingness to oomproad.se on the
issues discussed in this round? • .
U* To what extent were you emotionally involved in the negotia
tions? • * • • « • • •
#•••••
J>* To what extent were you appre
hensive as to the equity of nego
tiations?
........... .

___ ________________________

_____

*_________—

_

_ __ _ __ _ __ _____________ __

6. In an overall sense, how would
you charaetottse the energing trends
in the negotiations? (0 - strike
inevitable, 9 * lookout inevitable) _________________________
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APPENDIX 0
PSTCHOLOOIGAL INSIGHT TEST
(Adapted from H.A, Murry, 1938)
Directions: In this teat you are asked to compare your behavioral and
emotional reactions with those of most persons of your age - with the
hypothetical average among college students*
Read each statestent carefully and make up your mind whether it is more or
less true for you than it is for the average. Then, make a oheok in the
proper column.

Below
Average
-3
-1
I enjoy organising or directing the ac
tivities of a group, team, club, or
coradlttee
I am driven to ever greater efforts by
an unalacked ambition
.......
I am in my element when I am with a
group of people who enjoy life , . , ,
X take pains not to hurt the feelings
of others
............ .
I can dehl with an aotual situation
better than I oan oops with general
ideas and theories
X argue with seat for my point of view
against others •• ................
I feel that nothing else which life
oan offer is a substitute for great
achievement .
............

.

X become very attaohed to ay friends

,

I will take a good deal of trouble to
help a younger man - to get him a job,
to intercede for M m or in some other
way to further his interests • • . . ,
I have a rather good head for business

Above
Average
+1 +2

+3

£ find it rather easy to lead a group of
persona and maintain discipline . . .
I feel that ay future peace and. selfrespect depend upon my accomplishing
some notable pieee of work . . • . •
I give myself utterly to the happiness
of someone X love
I go out of ay m y to comfort people
when they are in misery......... .

X UUce being in the thick of action .
I usually influence others more than
they influence m e . . . , . . . . . .
X set difficult goals for myself which
I attempt to reach . • • ......... ,
I feel 'out of sorts' if X have to be by
myself for any length of time • • • .
X enjoy the company of younger people
I am Interested in everything that Is
going on in the world: business, poli
tics, social affairs, etc. • . • • •
X am usually the one to make the neoee
saiy decisions when X am with another
person . . . . . . . . . . . . . a .
X work with energy at the Job that lies
before me instead of dreaming about the
future
................. •
I like to hang around with a group of
congenial people and talk about any
thing that comes tq>....... .
X give ay time and energy to those who
ask for it ......... . . . . . . .
X am extremely interested In the ac
tivities of other people . . . . . .

I feel that I oan dominate a aoolal
situation • • • • • • • • • • « • • • •
When ngr own Interests are at stake, I
become entirely oonoentrated upon my
job and forget ny obligations to others
1 make as many friends as possible and
am on the lookout for mare • • » • • •
People are apt to tell me their innernost secrets and troubles . . • • • • •
I like to do things with uy hands: manual
labor, manipulation or construction * .
1 feel the sense of power that canes
when 1 am able to control the action of
others » • * • # • • • • • • • • • • •
I enjoy relaxation wholeheartedly only
when it follows the successful com
pletion of a substantial piece of work
X accept social invitations rather than
stay at hose alone •
I am easily moved by the misfortunes of
other people •
X am a practical person, interested in
tangible achievement . « • • • • • • •
X assert myself with energy when the
occasion demands it • • • • • • • • • •
I feel the spirit of competition in
most of my activities • » • • • • • • •
if possible, I have my friends with me
wherever I go • • • • » . • • * « • • •
I am drawn to people who are sick, un
fortunate or unhappy , , . .........
I like to have people about me most of
the tins
.......

I feel that I should like to be a leader
and sway others to my opinion.......
1 work like a slave at everything 1
undertake until I an satisfied with the
result
.............. .
I an desperately unhappy If I am sepa
rated from the person I lore . • • * .
I an especially oonsiderate of people
who are less fortunate than I .......
I would rather take an active part in
contemporary events than read and think
about then « • • , , • , • * * * • • *
I feel that I an driven by an underlying
desire for power • • • ............
I enjoy work as much as play

• • » • •

I sake a point of keeping in close touch
with the doings and interests of my
friends....................... .
1 feel great sympathy for an 'underdog*
and I am apt to do what X oan for that
person • . • « • • * • • • « • • , • •
Honey and social prestige are matters
of importance t o m e * . , ...........
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■APPENDIX S
TABUS X
DATA SET (258 Staples)''

a

b

e

O

16.8
11.1
10.5
12.6
10.2
10.5
11.u
11.il
6 .6
10.8
11.7
8*7
9 .9
8.7
6 .6

1
1
8
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1

1
I
1
1
8

8.7
9 .3
8.1
8.7
9 .0
9.3
9.3

6 .I 1
5 .0
6 .U
6 .U
7.2
U.O
U.2
ll.O
6 .6
6 .0
U.8
6 .0
6 .0
6.U
6.U
5 .0
U.6
6.6
3.2
6.8
U.6
U.6

8.7
10.8
7.2
7.2
9.9
9 .0
9.9

7.2
8 .0
6.6
6.6
5.8
U.8
U.8

£
m
abbreviated aat

1
1
8
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
S
1
1
1
8
8
1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
I
1

1

figures are aeaae except *e' and 'o' Which are
8 * Strike-Prone Behavior;

1 • Lockout-Prone Behavior*

TABLE X

(c<mt.)

DATA SET (2$B Samples)

a

Ik

e

o

11.7
10,5
10.5
7 .5
8.U
&5
7 .5
7.2
8.U
10.2
9.3
9.3
9 .0
8.U
7.2

U.6
U.8
3.6
5.6
U.O
5.6
5.6

1
8
1
8
1

X
1
X
8
X

8
1
8
1
8
1
8

8

6 .0
U.8
6 .0
7.2
5.1
5.7
6 .0

3.6
5.2
5.2
5.8
5.U
6.U
6.U
6.U
3.2
3.2
6.6
7.0
6.6
U.U
3.2

8.U
7 .5
9 .0
9.6
10.5
10.5
9.6

5.U
U.8
6.8
6.8
6 .0
8.0
8.0

5.U
8.U
8.1
7 .5
8.1
7.2
7.2

U.U
5.U
6.2
U.8
5.8
5.U
5.8

1
8
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
1
1
8
a
8

X
X
X
8
X
X
8
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
8
X
X
I
X
X
X
8
X
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TABLE X

(oont.)

DATA SET (258 Samples)

a

*

e

O

3.6
3.0
U.U
U.U
5.U
5.U
5.0

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

6.6
5.0
6.8
5.8
6.8
6 .2
6.8

1
1
a
1
s
8

8
1
1
1
1
8
8

7.8
10.2
6 .8
10.2
9 .0
7.8
5.7
5.7

6.2
5.6
6 .0
7.2
6.U
6.2
5.8
6.2

1
1
8
1
8
8
8
8

1
1
1
1
8
8
8

9 .0
6.9
8.7
7.5
6 .9
5.7
6 .9
5.7
6 .0
8.U
U.2
7.5
6 .3
7.2
5.U
5.1*

6 .2
7.U
6.8
7.8
7.8
7.0
7.8
7.8

1
8
i
8
8
8
1
8
1
1
8
1
8 '
1
8
8

■
6*9
8 .7
10.5
8.1
7 .5
8.U
8.7
10.8
12.3
7.8
10.5
8 .1 v
7.8

5.2
6.2
7.0
6.2
6 .2
6.2
U.6
6.2

1
1
8
8
8
8
a
8
1
8
1
8
8
8
8
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TABLE X

(coat,)

.DATA SET (2$8 Staples)

a

b

e

0

9.3
9.9
7.5
10,2
6 .0
U.8
U.8

7.6
7.0
7.0
5 .0
3.U
U.2
5 .0

1
1
8
1
a
a
a

s
1
8
1
1
8

12.3
9.9
9.6
8.7
U.6
5.1
U.8

6.U
8,2
U.U
6 .6
5.8
6.2
6.2

1
a
1
a
a
a
a

1

13.8
11.7
10.8
10.8
9.6
7.5
9 .6
9 .6

6.U
6.U
6 .6
6.2
5.6
7.6
6.8
5.6

1
8

1
8

1
8

1
1

1
1

1
1

10.2
8.1
7.8
9.6
6.3
11.U
8.1
8.1

U.U
6.2
5 .8
5.6
6 .0
5.U
U.U
5.U

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

9.6
9.3
6 .3
9.3
7.2
7 .5
7.5

8.6
7.6
8 .0
7.U
9.2
9.2
8.0

1
1
8
1
8
1
1

1
1
8
1

1
1
1

8
8
1
1

1
1
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TABLE X

(eonb.)

DATA SET (2J8 Saaplaa)

a

b

e

0

8.U
6 .6
7.5
7.8
9 .3
9 .3
6.6
9.9
10.8
9.3
3.9
8.1
9.0
9 .0

3.8
U.2
2.6
5.8
6.2
6.2

1
a
1

8

5.U
U.6
5.8
7.2
5.8
5.U
8.2
7.6

1
1
a
1
1
1

1
1
1
a
1
1
1
1

8.1
8.1
9.3
6 .6
8.1
8.1

6 .6
U.8
6.2
7.8
6.6

1
1
1
8
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

6 .0
9.3
8.1
10.2
6.9
8.7
7.8
8.1

6 .0
U.U
6.0
5.6
6.8
6.6
U.6
U.U

6 .9
6 .9
7.2
7.5
6.9
6.6
7.2
7.5

8.U
5.8
5.U
6.U
6 .8
U.6
U.U
U.U

u.e

1
1

1
1

8
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
8

1
1
1
8

1
1
1

1
1
1
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TABLE X

(oont.)

DATA SET (258 Samples)

a

b

e

o

7.2
6*3
7 .8
6 .9
7.2
6 .3
10.8
10.5
9 .9
10.5
10.8
10.8

5.U
7.2
6.0
5.U
5.U
7.2

1
a
1
a
1
a

1
a
1
1
1
a

U.6
6.2
6 .0
6.U
U.6
U.6

1
a
a
1
1
1

1
a
1
1
1
1

10.8
9 .0
10.8
9 .3
11.1
10.5
8.1
8.1

6.U
3.2
3.2
5.2
U.8
U.U
U.6
U.8

1
1
1
a
1
a
a
a

a
1
1
a
1
a
8
a

6 .9
7.2
7 .5
6 .9
7.2
6 .9
6 .9

U.6
5.2
5.6
U.6
6.2
6.2
6.2

1
a
a
1
a
a
a

1
a
8
1
1
8
8

9.0
8.7
9 .0
9 .3
8.7
7.5
7.2
7.5

6.8
5.8
6.8
6.8
6.2
5 .6
U.8
U.8

1
1
a
1
1
a
1
1

1
1
a
1
1
a
1
1
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TABLE X

(eont.)

DATA SET (258 Samples)

a

b

e

o

6.3
11 .U
9.3
9.0
9.3
9.3
10.2
11.U

7.0
6.6
6.2
7.2
6.6
6.2
6.2
U.U

s
1
s
s
1
1
1
1

1
1
8
S
1
1
1
1

lilt

APPENDIX F
ttlQE BARGAINING GAMS
The gene is played toy four employee representatives. They are gathered
to discuss a pay package recommended toy an arbitration committee. This
package has been individually rejected toy the employee representatives *
but due to various pressures they have agreed to formally discuss the
Issues* Progress on the package negotiations thus far is presented
below:

Position
Above rank of
Supervisor
Supervisor
Skilled workers
Semi-skilled/
unskilled

#
5

Proposed
Initial Initial
Mgt.
employee
demands
offer
20*
1*0%

15
150

15*
10*

21*0

6*

Pay Rise
Arbitrators1
reoommendatlons

Final
employee
demands

3055

35*

1*0*

2055

30*

UO*
Uo*

15*
10*

25*
20*

Additional information:
1* Positions of the rank of supervisor and above are not protected toy
union contract*
2«
3*

The organisation is labor-intensive*
There is one representative for each of the four groups.

1*. The state of the economy is contemporary.
3*

The Government may intervene if a compromise is not reached*

Buies of the game:
1* Representatives will debate whether to accept or reject the pay
package recoraaended toy the arbitrators. At the end of a 20-mlnute
session* the team will vote whether to continue to hold out. If the
package passes unanimously* the game is over.
2* Each representative completes a questionnaire at the end of the
session*
3.

If the package is rejected* three additional 20-minute sessions may
be called to order to end the deadlock. These other sessions ax's
presumed to take place in 30-day intervals. During this period* the
company is not functioning.

115
U.

New proposals are not permitted. The package must be considered
in its entirety* A record of proceedings will be maintained for
each session*

TABTJt iV
PAIOFF SCHEDULE FOR WAGE BARGAINING GAME

Semi-skilled/
Unskilled

Session I

Above rank of
Supervisor

Supervisor

Skilled

Compromise

12

8

0

2

3
5

6

Compromise

6

No dompromise

h

10
2

5
5

h
6

No compromise

2

Session II

Session X U

Compromise

6

No compromise

h

8
6

U
0

3
0

2
2

Session IV
Compromise
No compromise

h
0

1
0

Five additional points will be awarded for all participants for the in
formation they provide during the game.
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